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 I.  INTRODUCTION 
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In 2003, the Parliament of the United Kingdom enacted the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
(the Act), a wide-ranging statute that introduced “radical innovations into English criminal 
procedure.”1  Among other things, the Act grants the prosecution in a trial upon an indictment2 
in England and Wales3 the right to appeal certain rulings of the trial judge,4 including a ruling 
that the defendant has no case to answer5 because the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to 
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,6 i.e., a directed verdict of not guilty.7  If 
                                                 
1 Ian Dennis, Prosecution Appeals and Retrials for Serious Offences, [2004] CRIM. L.R. 619, 619. 
The Act resulted from the Criminal Justice Bill, which the Labour Government introduced into the House 
of Commons in November 2002 as part of its “overall package to reform the criminal justice system in England and 
Wales.” ANDREW KEOUGH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003: A GUIDE TO THE NEW LAW § 1.1 (2004).  The 
Government’s “programme of reform [was] guided by a single clear priority: to rebalance the criminal justice system 
in favour of the victim and the community so as to reduce crime and bring more offenders to justice.”   JUSTICE FOR 
ALL 14 (2002), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/jfawhitepaper.pdf. 
2  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (Eng.). 
3  Id. § 337. 
Although England and Wales are separate countries, see Interpretation Act, 1978, c. 30, sch. 1, para. 1 
(Eng.), for the sake of convenience the Author henceforth will use the word “England” to encompass both England 
and Wales. 
4 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 57(1), 58(2). 
The prosecution may bring an appeal only with the leave of the trial judge or the Court of Appeal.  Id.  § 
57(4).  See infra note 32. 
5  See infra note 33.   
A submission of no case to answer normally should be made at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief.  
ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE § 4-292 (J.P. Richardson ed., 2011) [hereinafter 
ARCHBOLD]; JOHN SPRACK, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.48 (13th ed. 2011).  
Nevertheless, “in an exceptional case a judge can consider a submission of no case to answer . . . as late as the close 
of the defence case.”  R v. C., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 854, [47] (Eng.) (quoting R v. Speechley, [2004] EWCA 
(Crim) 3067, [53] (Eng.)).  If the defendant fails to make a submission of no case to answer, the trial judge can 
“decide of his own motion that there is no case to answer.”  Id. (quoting Speechley, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 3067, 
[53]).  See generally ARCHBOLD, supra, § 4-292 to -303; SPRACK, supra, §§ 20.48-.55. 
6  See R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 61 (Eng.).  See also 
ARCHBOLD, supra note 5, § 4-293 (“A submission of no case should be allowed when there is no evidence upon 
which, if the evidence adduced were accepted, a reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict.”). 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard of proof in a criminal case in England, Woolmington v. 
DPP, [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.) 481-82 (Viscount Sankey) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 42-43 (2d ed. 1983), just as it is in the United States.   In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
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the prosecution’s appeal of the ruling succeeds, the Act allows the reviewing court to reverse the 
trial judge’s ruling8 and order either the defendant’s trial be resumed or he be tried a second time 
for the same offense.9  Prior to the effective date of the Act,10 a trial judge’s ruling of no case to 
answer in a trial on an indictment would have ended the case once and for all in favor of the 
accused.  For the ruling would have constituted an acquittal, and prosecutors in England had no 
right to appeal an acquittal in a trial upon an indictment11 and would effectively have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
364 (1970) (holding proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required in criminal cases). 
7  N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 3, at 61; SPRACK, supra note 5, § 20.52; 
WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 44. 
8  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(1). 
9  Id. § 61(4)(a), (b). 
For a discussion of the provisions of the Act, see infra text accompanying notes 29-62. 
10  The provisions of the Act allowing the prosecution to appeal certain rulings of the trial judge took effect 
on April 4, 2005.  Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No. 8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 
2005, S.I. 2005/950, art. 2(1), sch. 1(4) (Eng.). 
11  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19 (Eng.) (making no provision for an appeal by the prosecution of an 
acquittal in a trial on an indictment); LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156: DOUBLE JEOPARDY paras. 
2.11-.13 (1999) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156] (“In general the prosecution has 
no right of appeal against an acquittal . . . ..”); LAW COMMISSION, REPORT NO. 267: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND 
PROSECUTION APPEALS para. 2.38 (2001) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267] (“[T]he main business 
of the Crown Court, trying cases on indictment, is subject to a defence right of appeal only . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
Criminal Justice Bill, 2002, [Bill 8] Explanatory Notes para. 36 (Eng.) (“Under current legislation, . . . the 
prosecution has no . . .  right of appeal against a judicial decision to stop the trial.”), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmbills/008/en/03008x--.htm; Statement of the Attorney 
General, 654 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1782 (2003) (“It is a matter of serious concern that defendants have had a 
right of appeal against their conviction for almost a century while the prosecution has had no right to challenge a 
judge-ordered acquittal, no matter how manifestly unjust such a ruling may be on rare occasions.”); MARTIN L. 
FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 279 (1969) (“English law has generally refused to permit an appeal from an 
acquittal. . . .  At the present time the Court [of Criminal Appeal] has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only from a 
conviction.  No provision was made in the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907 to permit an appeal from an acquittal . . . 
.”); IAN MCLEAN, CRIMINAL APPEALS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPEALS TO AND FROM THE CROWN COURT 59 
(1980) (“No appeal lies against an acquittal on indictment.”); id. at 98 n.27 (“There is no right of appeal to the 
Criminal Division against an acquittal on indictment.”). 
Although the Attorney General can refer a point of law to the Court of Appeal, such a reference does “not 
affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made or any acquittal in that trial.” Criminal Justice Act, 1972, c. 
71, § 36(1), (7) (Eng.). 
The English Law Commission, whose work product is cited in the first paragraph of this note and later in 
this Article, is a body of five Commissioners appointed by the Lord Chancellor.  Law Commissions Act, 1965, c. 
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precluded from bringing a new charge for the same offense by the plea of autrefois acquit12 (a 
former acquittal).13  As one eighteenth century English defense attorney put it: “[W]henever, 
and by whatever means, there is an acquittal in a criminal prosecution, the scene is closed and 
the curtain drops.”14 
                                                                                                                                                             
22, § 1(1) (Eng.).  Parliament established the Law Commission in 1965 “[f]or the purpose of promoting the reform 
of the law [of England and Wales].”  Id.  The Law Commission is charged with 
tak[ing] and keep[ing] under review all the law. . . with a view to its systematic 
development and reform, including in particular the codification of such law, the 
elimination of anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments, the 
reduction of the number of separate enactments and generally the simplification 
and modernisation of the law . . . . 
Id. § 3(1). 
12  The plea, expressed in Norman-French, is spelled in various ways, including autrefoits acquit, e.g., 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *335, and auterfoits acquit, e.g., Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 
(H.L.) 1306-07 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  In this Article, the Author will use 
the spelling autrefois acquit, except when quoting material using a different spelling. 
13  The plea of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) is a special plea in bar that “give[s] a reason why the 
prisoner ought not to answer [the indictment] at all, nor put himself upon his trial for the crime alleged.”  4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *335.  The plea not only can be raised to an indictment for the same offense of 
which an individual previously has been acquitted, but also to an indictment for an offense in respect of which the 
individual, on a previous indictment, could have been convicted.  Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris of 
Borth-y-Gest); ENG. LAW REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.2.  In practice, however, second prosecutions are 
not brought and so do not reach court.  SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT, THE DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY RULE para. 6 (2000), available at
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmhaff/190/19002.htm [hereinafter SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE]; SPRACK, supra note 5, § 17.43 (“[I]t is rare in 
practice for the defence to be forced to have recourse to [the plea of autrefois acquit]. . . .  If [a previous 
prosecution] ended in [an individual’s] being . . .  acquitted . . .  he would not be prosecuted again for the same 
offence.”). 
14  Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 528 (1776). 
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By allowing the retrial of an individual for the same offense, or the resumption of his 
aborted trial, following a successful appeal by the prosecution of a trial judge’s ruling of no case 
to answer, the Act does indeed significantly change criminal procedure in England.  According 
to the English Law Commission, however, the second trial of the accused for the same offense, 
or the resumption of his initial trial, “involves no breach of the double jeopardy rule[],”15 i.e., the 
rule prohibiting a person from being tried twice for the same offense,16 because the autrefois 
rule17 and the “special application of the abuse of process rules”18–the two components of the 
                                                 
15  LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158: PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST JUDGES’ RULINGS 
para. 1.9 (2000) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158]. 
16  See, e.g.,  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S] (defining double 
jeopardy as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same offense.”). 
17  The autrefois rule, comprising the pleas of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) and autrefois convict (a 
former conviction), provides “that no-one may be put in peril twice for the same offence,” ENG. LAW COMM’N, 
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.2, so if “a person has previously been acquitted or convicted (or could, by 
an alternate verdict, have been convicted) of an offence and is later charged on indictment with the same offence, a 
plea of autrefois will bar the prosecution.”  Id. (italics added).  Accord Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1305 (Lord Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest); ARCHBOLD, supra note 5, § 4-117; SPRACK, supra note 5, §§ 17.43, 17.46.  See also Criminal 
Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, Explanatory Notes para. 1(40) (Eng.) (“The[] principles [of autrefois acquit and autrefois 
convict] provide a bar to [a second] trial, in respect of the same offence, of a person who has previously been either 
acquitted or convicted of that offence.”).  Both pleas, Blackstone explained, are based upon the “universal maxim of 
the common law of England,”  4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *335, that “no man is to be brought into jeopardy 
of his life, more than once for the same offence.”  Id. 
Recent legislation in England allows an acquittal to be quashed in two situations.  If an acquittal is 
quashed, the previously-acquitted defendant cannot raise the plea of autrefois acquit.  See Criminal Justice Act, 
2003, §§ 75-86 (permitting the Court of Appeal to quash an acquittal for certain serious offenses when “there is new 
and compelling evidence against the acquitted person,” and authorizing the retrial of the individual for the same 
offense); Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54-57 (Eng.) (permitting the High Court of 
Justice to quash an acquittal that was “tainted,” and authorizing the retrial of the individual for the same offense).  
The Author previously has written about these two provisions.  See David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in 
England, Part I: The Exception to the Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “New and Compelling Evidence,” 8 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 387 (2007); David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part II: The Exception to the 
Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “Tainted Acquittals,” 9 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 217 (2008). 
18  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.14. 
Under the abuse of process rules, the trial judge has “the discretion to stay proceedings which would be an 
abuse of the process of the court,” id. para. 2.1, when the “defendant has already been acquitted or convicted on the 
same or substantially the same facts.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Accord Connelly, [1964] A.C. at 1306-07 (Lord 
Devlin); id. at 1296 (Lord Reid); id. at 1362-68 (Lord Pearce); Criminal Justice Act, 2003, Explanatory Notes para. 
1(40) (“[T]he courts may consider it an abuse of process for additional charges to be brought, following an acquittal 
or conviction, for different offences which arose from the same behaviour or facts.”).  See also ARCHBOLD, supra 
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protection against double jeopardy law in England–merely “prevent a final acquittal or 
conviction from being re-opened,”19 and an acquittal entered by a trial judge before the jury has 
considered the evidence is not yet final. 
                                                                                                                                                             
note 5, § 4-48 (discussing Connelly).  For a discussion of the abuse of process rules, see ENG. LAW COMM’N, 
REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.14.  See generally ANDREW L-T. CHOO, ABUSE OF PROCESS AND JUDICIAL 
STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2d ed. 2008). 
19  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158], supra note 15, para. 1.8.  Accord ENG. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.1 (“[T]he ‘autrefois’ rule . . . states that a defendant who has been 
finally convicted or acquitted may not be tried again for the same offence . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
Because the doctrine applies in England only when there has been an acquittal or a conviction, Professor 
Glanville Williams stated that “the expression ‘double jeopardy’ . . . is misleading for English law,” as “[t]he 
defence is not given to a person merely because he was previously at risk of being convicted.”  WILLIAMS, supra 
note 6, at 164. 
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England is not alone in this position.  Countries throughout the world that recognize the 
rule against double jeopardy,20 nevertheless allow the prosecution to challenge at least some 
acquittals by way of appeal.21  Included among these countries are many that trace their legal 
                                                 
20  The rule that the government should not try a person twice for the same offense–called the principle of 
ne bis in idem, Gerald Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.  217, 217 (2003); Maria 
Fletcher, Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the European Union: Criminal Proceedings Against 
Hüseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge, 66 M.L.R. 769, 770 (2003), or non bis in idem, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent 
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 235, 288 (1993), on the European continent–is 
accepted throughout the world.  MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS’ COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE 
ATTORNEYS-GENERAL, MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, CHAPTER 2, ISSUE ESTOPPEL, DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST ACQUITTALS 1 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MODEL 
CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER] (noting the double jeopardy “principle stands in constitutional status in over 50 
countries”); Bassiouni, supra, at 289 & n.262 (asserting “[t]he right to protection from double jeopardy and non bis 
in idem are found in over fifty national constitutions,” and listing those constitutional provisions).  See also 
Conway, supra, at 217 (stating the maxim ne bis in idem, or the rule against double jeopardy, “is prevalent among 
the legal systems of the world”).  See, e.g., Pearce v The Queen, (1998) 194 C.L.R. 610 (Austl.) (discussing the rule 
against double jeopardy in Australia); Constitution Act, 1982, pt. 1, § 11(h) (U.K.) (providing that in Canada, “[a]ny 
person charged with an offence has the right . . . if finally found acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again, 
and if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again”); INDIA CONST. art. 
20, § 2 (“No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.”); CONSTITUCIÓN 
POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [CONST.] art. 23, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) (“No person, whether 
acquitted or convicted, can be tried twice for the same offense.”); Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 26(2) (N.Z.) (“No one 
who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again.”); 
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35(3)(m) (“Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes the right not to 
be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or 
convicted . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.); 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “7.  No one shall be liable 
to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.”  United Nations Convention for the Protection of 
Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 12, 
1976). 
For brief histories of the protection against double jeopardy, see DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
1-15 (2004); JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 1-21 (1969); 
GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 72-84 (1998); and David S. Rudstein, A Brief 
History of the Fifth Amendment Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 193, 196-232 
(2005). 
21  Among the countries recognizing the rule against double jeopardy but nevertheless apparently allowing 
the prosecution to appeal an acquittal are: Argentina, Alejandro D. Carrió & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 51-52 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY] (“[A] judgment rendered by a trial court is subject to an appeal only on points of law. . . .  
[T]he right to appeal is given not only to the defendant but to the prosecutor as well, in [a] case where there is an 
acquittal . . . .  The Supreme Court has held that to permit the appeal of an acquittal by the prosecution does not 
violate due process nor constitute[] a double jeopardy violation.” (footnote omitted)); Belgium, Brigitte Pesquié, 
revised by Yves Cartuyvels, The Belgian System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 81, 98, 99-100, 130-31, 131 
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds. 2002) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES] (an acquittal of 
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a délit can be appealed to the local cour d’appel; a decision in the cour d’assises, which tries crimes, can be 
reviewed by the Cour de cassation, but only on a point of law, following a definitive judgment, i.e., “one that puts 
an end to the proceedings by conviction, acquittal or absolute discharge of the case”); see also THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS paras. 3.29, 3.45 (1993) 
[hereinafter ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; France, Richard S. Frase, France, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, 
supra, at 235-36 (the Attorney General may appeal an acquittal rendered by a cour d’assises (Assize Court), the 
court that tries crimes (the most serious offenses), to the Appellate Assize Court for a trial de novo on all issues of 
fact or law raised by the appeal; the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general for the appellate district may appeal 
an acquittal rendered by a tribunal correctionnel, the court with jurisdiction to try délits (less serious felonies and 
some misdemeanors) to the regional cour d’appel for what could potentially be a trial de novo on all issues of fact or 
law raised by the appeal); Valérie Dervieux, revised by Mikaël Benillouche & Olivier Bachelet, The French System, 
in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra, at 218, 274 (“[A]cquittals given by the cour d’ assises may be the 
subject of an appeal on the merits.”); id. (“Any decision by the tribunal correctionnel . . . may be subject of an 
appeal on the merits. . . .  Appeals against . . . acquittals recorded by the tribunal correctionnel are handled by the 
local cour d’appel . . . .”); Italy, Antoinette Perrodet, revised by Elena Ricci, The Italian System, in EUROPEAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra, at 348, 399 (“In principle, appeals may be brought against convictions or 
acquittals.”); id. at 400 (“[T]he corti di assise di appello decides appeals against convictions or acquittals by the 
corte di assise,” the court that has jurisdiction over the most serious offenses); Rachel A. Van Cleave, Italy, in A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra, at 303, 330, 330-31, 348 (“[T]he public prosecutor . . . may appeal [to the corte di assise 
di appello] a judgment” of the Corte di assise, the court that “has jurisdiction over the most serious crimes . . . .,” 
and to the Corte di appello a judgment of the tribunale, the court that has jurisdiction over less serious crimes); see 
also ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, para. 10.44; Mexico, Miguel Sarré & Ian Perlin, Mexico, in A 
WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra, at 351, 389-90 (“Both the prosecution and the defense may appeal [a trial verdict]. . . .  
The appeals court may review whether or not the appropriate law was applied, and whether it was applied correctly.  
The appeals court decides whether the lower court violated the ruling principles for evaluating evidence, the facts 
were altered, or indeed, if the decision was based on sufficient facts and the relevant law correctly applied. . . .  
Appeals of a verdict . . . also permit the presentation of new evidence, which means the appeals judge may review 
both the law and the facts, and indeed find and hear new evidence and determine additional facts.”); The 
Netherlands,  ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, para. 11.32 (“The . . . prosecutor can appeal as of right 
against judgments of the district courts, to one of the five courts of appeal.”); A.H.J. Swart, The Netherlands, in 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 279, 314 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed. 1993) 
(“Appeal involves a complete retrial by another, higher, judicial authority.  If the accused was acquitted at the first 
trial he may not be convicted in appeal unless the court’s decision is unanimous.”); Russia, Catherine Newcombe, 
Russia, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra , at 397, 461 (“The court hearing [an] appeal [from a Justice of the Peace 
Court] may reverse an acquittal . . . pursuant to a representation [by the prosecutor] . . . arguing that the acquittal was 
not well-founded.”); id. at 462-63 (“[A] court of cassation may reverse an acquittal [by a District Court] . . . pursuant 
to petitions for review from the prosecutor . . . ”; however, “a jury acquittal may only be reversed if there were 
violations of criminal procedure law that interfered with the right of the prosecutor . . . to present evidence or 
affected the content of the juror questionnaire and the answers thereto.”); Spain, ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra, para. 13.52 (“There is no appeal from the Provincial Criminal Court [the court that tries serious 
offenses] on the grounds that the Court decided the facts of the case wrongly.  The only appeal from this Court is 
when (1) the court has misapplied the law; or (2) the court has made an error in procedure.  All parties to the 
proceedings have the right to appeal, including the prosecution.”); and Sweden, RICHARD J. TERRILL, WORLD 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A SURVEY 333 (5th ed. 2003) (“[O]nce a trial is concluded, the parties have an 
opportunity to appeal the court’s judgment to a court of appeal. . . .  [B]oth) the defendant and the prosecutor have 
the right to appeal.  In the petition for appeal, the appellant must state the factual or legal grounds for the appeal.”). 
The European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the rule against double jeopardy, but nevertheless 
permits the prosecution to have rights of appeal.  Article 4(1) of that Convention provides: “No one shall be liable 
to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for 
which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that 
State.”  Protocol 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, Nov. 
22, 1984 (emphasis added).  The Explanatory Report to Article 4 provides: “The principle established in this 
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heritage to England.22  In addition, the Australian states of New South Wales, Tasmania, and 
Western Australia, which also trace their legal heritage to England and which also recognize the 
rule against double jeopardy,23 allow the prosecution to appeal some acquittals.24 
                                                                                                                                                             
provision applies only after the person has been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of the State concerned.  This means that there must have been a final decision . . . .”  Id., Explanatory 
Report para. 29 (emphasis added).  The Explanatory Report further provides that “a decision is final ‘if, according 
to the traditional expression, it has acquired the force of res judicata.  This is the case when it is irrevocable, that is 
to say when no further ordinary remedies are available or when the parties have exhausted such remedies or have 
permitted the time-limit to expire without availing themselves of them.’”  Id., Explanatory Report para. 22 (quoting 
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Explanatory Note, Commentary on 
Article 1(a), May 28, 1970).  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 1.13 (asserting the 
Convention permits the prosecution to have rights of appeal); id. para. 1.17 (“Allowing the prosecution to challenge 
an acquittal by way of appeal . . . (that is, before it becomes final), does not in principle present any difficulty in 
terms of compliance with the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights].”). 
22  E.g., Canada, Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (1985) (Can.) (“The Attorney General or 
counsel instructed by him for the purpose may appeal to the court of appeal . . . . . . against a judgment or verdict of 
acquittal . . . of a trial court in proceedings by indictment on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law 
alone . . . .”); Israel, Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Israel, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 21, at 273, 298-99 (“The 
prosecution . . . may submit an appeal against the judgment–both the verdict and the sentence.  A defendant may not 
raise a claim of double jeopardy against an appeal submitted by the prosecution. . . .  An appeal may be submitted 
against determinations of both law and fact.” (footnote omitted)); New Zealand, Crimes Act 1961, § 380 (N.Z.) (“(1) 
The court before which any accused person is tried may, either during or after the trial, reserve for the opinion of the 
Court of Appeal . . . any question of law arising either on the trial or on any of the proceedings preliminary, 
subsequent, or incidental thereto, or arising out of the direction of the Judge . . . .  (3) Either the prosecutor or the 
accused may during the trial apply to the court to reserve any such question as aforesaid . . . . (4) If the result of the 
trial is acquittal the accused shall be discharged, subject to being again arrested if the Court of Appeal orders a new 
trial.”); id. § 381 (allowing the prosecutor to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal if the trial judge refuses 
an application to reserve a question of law for the opinion of the Court of Appeal); id. § 381A (setting forth a 
procedure under which the prosecutor can seek review of a question of law arising out of a trial judge’s decision 
during the trial to discharge, i.e., acquit, a defendant); South Africa, P.J. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, South 
Africa in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 21, at 471, 515 (“The prosecution has no right to appeal against an 
acquittal on the facts.  It does, however, have a right to appeal against a court’s decision on law . . . .”). 
23  New South Wales and Tasmania recognize a plea of former acquittal or former conviction.  Criminal 
Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) § 156(1) (Austl.) (“In any plea of autrefois convict, or of autrefois acquit, it is sufficient 
for the accused person to allege that he or she has been lawfully convicted or acquitted, as the case may be, of the 
offence charged in the indictment, without specifying the time or place of the previous conviction or acquittal.”); 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) sch. 1, § 355 (Austl.) (“(1) An accused person may plead to an indictment . . . (b) that 
he has already been acquitted or convicted–(i) of the crime charged in the indictment; (ii) upon an indictment upon 
which he might have been convicted of that crime; (iii) of a crime arising out of the same facts and substantially the 
same crime as that charged in that indictment; (iv) of any crime, an acquittal or conviction of which is, under the 
provisions of the Code, a bar to a prosecution for the crime charged in the indictment; or (v) summarily, of an 
offence in respect of which he might have been indicted upon the charge to which he is called upon to plead . . . .”), 
while the Western Australia Criminal Code provides “[i]t is a defence to a charge of any offence to show that the 
accused person has already been tried, and convicted or acquitted upon an indictment or prosecution notice on which 
he might have been convicted of the offence with which he is charged, or has already been convicted or acquitted of 
an offence of which he might be convicted upon the indictment or prosecution notice on which he is charged.”  
 
 10 
                                                                                                                                                             
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) App. B, § 17. 
24  In New South Wales, the prosecution can appeal only an acquittal by a jury at the direction of the trial 
judge, Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) § 107(1)(a), (2) (Austl.); e.g., R v R.K., [2008] NSWCCA 338, 
[1]-[2], [70], [73]-[75], [77]-[79], [2008] NSWLR 80, 82, 94 (NSW Crim. App.) (Austl.) (but upholding the trial 
judge’s decision to direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty), or an acquittal by the judge sitting without a jury 
in a trial of an indictable offense.  Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 § 107(1)(b), (2).  Such an appeal, 
however, is restricted to a “ground that involves a question of law alone.”  Id. § 107(2).  If the Court of Appeal 
finds the trial judge committed error, it may quash the acquittal, id. § 107(5), and order a new trial.  Id. § 107(6). 
Tasmania allows the Attorney-General, with the leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or upon the 
certificate of the trial judge that it is a fit case for appeal, to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal “against an 
acquittal on a question of law” in a trial upon an indictment, Criminal Code Act 1924 sch. 1, § 401(2).   E.g., DPP v 
Cook, [2006] TASSC 75, [47], [49] (Tas. Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Crawford, J.) (granting the prosecutor’s application 
for leave to appeal an individual’s acquittal by a jury); id. at [91], [93]-[94] (Blow, J.) (same); id. at [150] (Tennent, 
J.) (same).  If the Court of Appeal finds that the verdict of the jury was unreasonable or cannot be supported having 
regard to the evidence, the trial court reached the wrong decision on a question of law, or there was a miscarriage of 
justice, it can set aside the verdict or judgment, allow the appeal, Criminal Code Act 1924  § 402(1), and either enter 
a conviction, id. § 402(5)(b), or order a new trial.  Id. § 402(5)(c).  E.g., R v Pirimona, [1998] TASSC 136 (Tas) 
(Austl.) (ordering a retrial after setting aside a “verdict of acquittal entered by direction of the . . . trial judge”); R v 
Jenkins, [1970] Tas SR 13, 24 (Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Crisp, J.) (setting aside the defendant’s acquittal and ordering a 
new trial because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence); id. at 27 (Neasey, J.) (same); id. at 30 (Chambers, J.) 
(same). 
In Western Australia, the prosecution, “in relation to a charge of an indictable offence,” Criminal Appeals 
Act 2004 (WA) § 24(2), and with the leave of the Court of Appeal, id. § 27(1), can appeal “a judgment of acquittal . . 
. entered after a jury’s verdict of not guilty of a charge the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment 
for 14 years or more or life, but only on the grounds that before or during the trial the judge made an error of fact or 
law in relation to the charge,” id. § 24(2)(da), as well as “a judgment of acquittal . . . entered in a trial by the judge 
alone,” id. § 24(2)(e)(ii), or “entered after a decision by the judge that the accused has no case to answer on the 
charge.”  Id. § 24(2)(e)(i).  If the Court of Appeal finds in favor of the prosecution, it can set aside the acquittal and 
order a new trial.  Id. § 33(1), (2)(a).  E.g., State v Tilbrook, [2007] WASCA 4, [1], [40]-[42] (WA) (ordering a 
new trial after setting aside judgments of acquittal entered by the trial judge after finding that none of the defendants 
had a case to answer). 
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Those common law jurisdictions authorizing prosecution appeals of some acquittals 
typically permit an appeal of a trial judge’s directed verdict of not guilty,25 and if the appeal is 
successful, allow the government to retry the accused.26  In the United States, however, neither 
the federal government nor any state authorizes the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s directed 
verdict of not guilty or its equivalent.27  At least one reason for this may be that legislatures 
assume a provision authorizing such an appeal would not pass muster under the Double Jeopardy 
                                                 
25  E.g., Rowbotham v. The Queen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463, 474-75 (Can.) (interpreting Criminal Code, 
R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 676(1)(a)); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) § 107(1)(a), (2); Crimes Act 1961, § 
381A (N.Z.) (setting forth a procedure under which the prosecutor can seek review of a question of law arising out 
of a trial judge’s decision during the trial to discharge, i.e., acquit, the defendant).  See Pirimona, [1998] TASSC 
136 (upholding the Attorney-General’s appeal under Criminal Code Act 1924 sch.1, § 401(2) of a “verdict of 
acquittal entered by direction of the . . . trial judge”).  See also Jenkins, [1970] Tas SR at 15 (indicating Criminal 
Code Act 1924 sch.1, § 401(2) clearly allows the prosecution to appeal a directed verdict of acquittal); Criminal 
Appeals Act 2004 (WA) § 24(2)(e)(i). 
26  E.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, ch. C-46, § 686(4)(b)(i) (Can.); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 
2001 (NSW) § 107(5)-(6); Crimes Act 1961, § 382(2)(b) (N.Z.); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) sch. 1, § 402(5)(c); 
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) § 33(1), (2)(a). 
27  Many jurisdictions in the United States have substituted for a directed verdict of not guilty the 
functionally-equivalent court-ordered judgment of acquittal, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (“After the government 
closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment 
of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.  The court may on its own 
consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West 2004) (“In 
a case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on 
either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of 
one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.”); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a) (“If, at the close of the 
evidence for the state or at the close of all the evidence in the cause, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is 
insufficient to warrant a conviction, it may, and on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or the defendant shall, 
enter a judgment of acquittal.”), or required finding of not guilty.  E.g., MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a) (“The judge on 
motion of a defendant or on his own motion shall enter a finding of not guilty of the offense charged in an indictment 
or complaint or any part thereof after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient as a matter 
of law to sustain a conviction on the charge.  If a defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty is made at 
the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, it shall be rule upon at that time. . . .”).  For the sake of convenience, 
the Author henceforth will use the terms directed verdict of not guilty, court-ordered acquittal, and required finding 
of not guilty interchangeably. 
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,28 because it would lead to a 
second trial of the defendant for the same offense.  This Article will examine that assumption 
and attempt to answer the question whether a provision similar to that contained in England’s 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 would be constitutional in the United States. 
 
 II.  THE ENGLISH MODEL 
                                                 
28  U.S. CONST. amend, V (“No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.”). 
It is of course possible that because so few directed verdicts of not guilty, or the equivalent, are rendered in 
a particular jurisdiction, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(i), at 97 n.110 (2d ed. 2003) 
[hereinafter LAFAVE] (“[S]tatistics show that directed verdicts are not granted in a large number of cases.” (citing 
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 508 (1966) [hereinafter KALVEN & ZEISEL])), that the 
legislature (or supreme court) does not perceive the possibility of a significant number of erroneous directed verdicts 
to be a problem worth its time and effort. 
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The Criminal Justice Act 2003 grants the prosecution in a trial upon an indictment29 the 
right to appeal30 to the Court of Appeal,31 after obtaining leave to do so,32 certain rulings of the 
trial judge, including a ruling that the defendant has no case to answer.33  The prosecution can 
                                                 
29  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (Eng.). 
A trial on an indictment takes place in the Crown Court, Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 003, § 46(1) (Eng.); 
references to a “judge” in the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 now being discussed are “to a judge of the 
Crown Court.”  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 74(2). 
30  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 57(1), 58(2). 
31  Id. § 57(3). 
32  The prosecution can appeal only with leave of either the trial judge or the Court of Appeal.  Id. § 57(4). 
Under the Criminal Procedure Rules adopted pursuant to the Act, see id. § 73(1), 2(a), if the prosecution 
seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, it must do so by either “apply[ing] orally, with reasons, immediately after 
the ruling against which [it] wants to appeal,” Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,  67.5(1)(a) (Eng.), 
or, if it receives an adjournment to consider whether to appeal, see infra text accompanying notes 36-38, by 
“apply[ing] in writing” following the adjournment.  Criminal Procedure Rules, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b). When the 
prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, the trial judge must decide whether to give permission to 
appeal “on the day that the application for permission is made.”  Id. 67.5(4). 
In deciding whether to allow leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal, and presumably the trial judge, must 
“look rather more widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask [itself] whether an appeal has a realistic 
prospect of success, or some other test directed solely at the merits of the appeal.”  R v. Bowers, [2009] EWCA 
(Crim) 2186, [8], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 283 (Eng.). 
33  The Act does not list the specific types of rulings the prosecution can appeal.  Rather, it provides that 
“[t]he prosecution may appeal in respect of,” Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(2), “a ruling [made by] a judge . . . in 
relation to a trial on indictment at an applicable time [where] the ruling relates to one or more offences included in 
the indictment.”  Id. § 58(1).  The Act goes on to define “applicable time” as “any time . . . before the time the 
judge starts his summing-up to the jury,” id. § 58(13), or, if the judge has made an order that the trial is to be 
conducted without a jury because of evidence that jury tampering would take, or has taken, place, see id. §§ 44, 46, 
“the time when the judge would start his summing-up if there were a jury.” id. § 58(14)], and states that a “‘ruling’ 
includes a decision, determination, direction, finding, notice, order, refusal, rejection or requirement.”  Id. § 74(1).  
It is clear, however, the prosecution can appeal a judge’s ruling of no case to answer.  Id. § 58(7) (providing that if 
“the ruling [being appealed by the prosecution is] a ruling that there is no case to answer,” the prosecution also can 
appeal other rulings made by the trial judge that relate to the offense or offenses that are the subject of the appeal); 
id. § 61(6)-(8) (dealing with situations in which “the appeal relates to a ruling that there is no case to answer and one 
or more other rulings”); R v. G.S., [2012} EWCA (Crim) 398, [1], [4], [28] (Eng.) (allowing the prosecution’s 
appeal of a ruling of no case to answer); R v. Q., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1584, [1], [20], [2011] 2 Crim. App. 25, at 
365, 369 (Eng.) (considering and dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer); R v. P., 
[2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32] (Wales) (same); R v. W., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. given) 
(allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer).  See also Crown Prosecution Service, 
Prosecution Rights of Appeal, Part I, Law and Procedure, The General Right of Appeal, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/appeal_prosecution_rights/index.html (“[T]he intention of the 2003 Act is to 
restrict the right of appeal to terminating rulings, such as . . . a ruling of no case to answer . . . .”); KEOUGH, supra 
note 1, § 9.2.1 (“Appeals will . . . be confined to those rulings that have the effect of stopping the prosecution and 




appeal such a ruling only if, “immediately after the ruling,”34 it “informs the court that it intends 
to appeal,”35 or, alternatively, “immediately after the ruling”36 it requests an adjournment,37 and 
if one is granted,38 it “informs the court following the adjournment that it intends to appeal.”39  
However, the prosecution may not inform the court it intends to appeal “unless, at or before that 
time,”40 it also informs the court it agrees the defendant should be acquitted of the offense in 
                                                 
34  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,  67.2(1)(a).  Accord R v. M., [2012] EWCA (Crim) 
792, [8] (Eng.) (“T]his court [has] made it clear that ‘immediately’ in rule 67.2(1)(a) of the [Criminal Procedure] 
Rules means ‘immediately’ and that it is a correct interpretation of the requirement of the 2003 Act itself.”); id. at 
[28] (“It is clear that . . . the decision to appeal . . . must be notified to the court immediately.”); R v. N.T., [2010] 
EWCA (Crim) 711, [13], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 89 (Eng.) (stating the provision of the criminal procedure rule 
“plainly represent[s] a correct interpretation of” the statutory provision); CPS v. C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [42] 
(Eng.) (dictum).  See also R v. A.T., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 668, [7]-[8] (Eng.) (refusing to consider “whether the 
Act and the Rules allow for any flexibility in more meritorious cases than this one”). 
35  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(i). 
36  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,  67.2(2)(a).  Accord M., [2012] EWCA (Crim) 792, 
[28] (“It is clear that . . . an adjournment must be sought immediately . . . .”); N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [13], 
[2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 89 (stating the provision of the criminal procedure rule “plainly represent[s] a correct 
interpretation of” the statutory provision). 
37  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(ii). 
38  See id. § 58(5) (“If the prosecution requests an adjournment . . . , the judge may grant such an 
adjournment.”). 
The applicable criminal procedure rule indicates the judge normally should grant a request for an 
adjournment.  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709,  67.2(2)(b) (“[T]he general rule is that the judge 
must not require the appellant to decide there and then [whether he wants to appeal].”)  It also indicates the 
adjournment generally should be only “until the next business day.”  Id. 67.2(2)(b).  But see R v. H., [2008] EWCA 
(Crim) 483, [10]-[12] (Eng.) (holding the court has the power to grant a greater extension of time than “until the next 
business day”). 
39  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(b). 
When the judge’s ruling relates to two or more offenses, any of those offenses may be the subject of the 
appeal, id. § 58(6)(a), but “if the prosecution informs the court . . . that it intends to appeal, it must at the same time 
inform the court of the offence or offences which are subject of the appeal.”  Id. § 58(6)(b). 
If the prosecution informs the court it intends to appeal a ruling of no case to answer, it may also appeal one 
or more other rulings made by the trial judge relating to the offense or offenses that are the subject of the appeal.  
Id. § 58(7) (provided the prosecution identifies the other ruling or rulings at the same time it informs the judge of its 
intention to appeal the ruling of no case to answer).  If the prosecution informs the court it intends to appeal a 
ruling, the proceedings may continue with respect to any offense that is not the subject of the appeal.  Id. § 60. 
40  Id. § 58(8). 
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question if either leave to appeal is not obtained or the prosecution abandons its appeal before 
the Court of Appeal determines it.41 
                                                 
41  Id. § 58(8)-(9). 
The prosecution’s agreement to this effect has been labeled an “acquittal agreement,” e.g., M., [2012] 
EWCA (Crim) 792, [9]; N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [9], [15], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 87, 89; CPS v. C., 
[2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [35] (Eng.), or an “acquittal undertaking,” R v. B., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 99, [14], [23] 
(Eng.).  If the prosecution does not undertake an “acquittal agreement” “at or before” the time it informs the court it 
intends to appeal a ruling, the prosecution cannot appeal.  N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [18], [2010] 2 Crim. 
App. 12, at 90;  C., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2614, [40]-[41].  See also M., [2012] EWCA (Crim) 792, [28] (“It is 
clear that . . . the decision to appeal and the acquittal agreement must be notified to the court immediately.  In any 
event, the acquittal agreement must be provided by at latest the time when a decision to intend to appeal is notified.  
What in this context does “immediately following the ruling” mean?  In our judgment it means there and then and in 
any event before anything important had happened.  We think it would be going too far to say that it means 
simultaneously with the conclusion of the ruling, and section 58(3) suggests that the requirement has functional 
rather than merely temporal bite.”). 
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When “the prosecution informs the court . . . that it intends to appeal, the [trial] judge 
must decide whether . . . the appeal should be expedited.”42  If the judge concludes the appeal 
should be expedited, he can order an adjournment of the trial.43  If, on the other hand, the judge 
determines the appeal should not be expedited, he can either order an adjournment of the trial44 
or discharge the jury, if one has been empaneled.45 
A ruling by the trial judge has no effect during the period in which the prosecution can 
inform the court it intends to appeal that ruling,46 nor during the pendency of any appeal it 
decides to pursue.47  In addition, “any consequences of the ruling . . . also have no effect,”48 and 
“the [trial] judge may not take any steps in consequence of the ruling.”49 
                                                 
42  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(1). 
If the prosecution wants the judge to expedite the appeal, it must request the judge to do so, giving reasons, 
when it informs the judge it intends to appeal.  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.6(1). 
43  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(2). 
If the trial judge decides the appeal should be expedited, he, or the Court of Appeal, can subsequently 
reverse that decision.  If it is reversed, the trial judge can either order an adjournment of the trial or discharge the 
jury if one has been empaneled.  Id. § 59(4) 
44  Id. § 59(3)(a). 
45  Id. § 59(3)(b). 
46  Id. § 58(3)-(4). 
47  Id. § 58(10). 
48  Id. § 58(11)(a). 
49  Id. § 58(11)(b). 
If the trial judge nevertheless takes any steps in consequence of the ruling, those steps are to have no effect. 
 Id. § 58(11)(c). 
According to one commentator, sections 58(11)(b) and (c) of the Act mean, among other things, that the 
trial judge, as a consequence of the ruling of no case to answer, cannot release the defendant on bail pending the 
appeal, “if that decision flowed from the judge’s view that there was no evidence against the defendant.”  KEOUGH, 
supra note 1, § 9.2.5. 
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On appeal,50 “the Court of Appeal may confirm, reverse or vary [the trial judge’s] 
ruling.”51  It may not, however, reverse a ruling “unless it is satisfied”52 the ruling either “was 
wrong in law,”53 “involved an error in law or principle,”54 or “was a ruling that was not 
reasonable for the judge to have made.”55  If the Court of Appeal confirms the ruling, it must 
order the defendant acquitted of the offense or offenses in question.56  On the other hand, if the 
court reverses or varies the ruling, it must, with respect to each offense in question, “order that 
proceedings for [the] offence may be resumed”57 or “that a fresh trial may take place . . . for [the 
same] offence;”58 but if the court determines the defendant could not receive a fair trial if the 
original trial were resumed or at a new trial,59 it must order the defendant be acquitted of the 
offense in question.60  The decision of the Court of Appeal can, with leave,61 be appealed to the 
                                                 
50  If the prosecution does not obtain leave to appeal, or if it abandons the appeal before the Court of 
Appeal determines it, the defendant must be acquitted of the offense in question.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 
58(12). 
51  Id. § 61(1). 
52  Id. § 67. 
53  Id. § 67(a). 
54  Id. § 67(b). 
55  Id. § 67(c). 
56  Id. § 61(3), (6)-(7). 
57  Id. § 61(4)(a).  See also id. § 61(6), (8) (dealing with the situation in which the prosecution is appealing 
additional rulings by the trial judge). 
58  Id. § 61(4)(b).  See also id. § 61(6), (8) (dealing with the situation in which the prosecution is appealing 
additional rulings by the trial judge). 
59  Id. § 61(5). 
60  Id. § 61(4)(c).  See also id. § 61(8) (dealing with the situation in which additional rulings by the trial 
judge are being appealed). 
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Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by either the defendant or the prosecution.62 
 
 III.  THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
A.  In General 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”63  More than a half-century ago, in Green v. United States,64 the 
Supreme Court articulated the overall design of this provision.  It stated: 
The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to protect 
an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction 
more than once for an alleged offense. . . . 
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the 
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all it resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he 
may be found guilty.65 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
61  Leave to appeal must be obtained from either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(2) (Eng.).  “Such leave shall not be granted unless it is certified 
by the Court of Appeal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision,” id., and in 
addition, “it appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) that the point is one which 
ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.”  Id. 
62  Id. § 33(1), as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 68(1). 
63  U.S. CONST., amend. V. 
64  355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
65  Id. at 187-88. 
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The prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment is “fundamental to 
the American scheme of justice.”66   As such, it is “incorporated”67 into the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment68 and applies to the same extent against the individual states as it 
does against the federal government.69 
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy stems from the common-law pleas 
                                                 
66  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Accord id. at  794 
(“[T]he double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our constitutional 
heritage . . . .”). 
The Supreme Court in Benton stated: 
The fundamental nature of the guarantee against double jeopardy can 
hardly be doubted.  Its origins can be traced to Greek and Roman times, and it 
became established in the common law of England long before this nation’s 
independence.  As with many other elements of the common law, it was carried 
into the jurisprudence of this country through the medium of Blackstone, who 
codified the doctrine in his Commentaries. . . .  Today, every State incorporates 
some form of the prohibition in its constitution or common law. . . .  [The] 
underlying notion [that the state should not be allowed to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense] has from the very 
beginning been part of our constitutional tradition. 
Id. at 795-96 (footnotes and citation omitted). 
67  Id. at 794 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Accord id. at 801 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); id. at 808.  See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 & n.12 (2010) 
(noting that the Court in Benton held the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
68  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o . . .State shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
69  Benton, 395 U.S. at 794, 796. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Benton, the Court “ has ‘. . .  looked to the specific guarantees of the 
[Bill of Rights] to determine whether a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law,’” id. at 794 
(quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967) (bracketed material added by the Court)), and if “it is decided 
that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ the same constitutional 
standards apply against both the State and Federal Governments.”  Id. at 795 (citation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).  See also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034-35 (“[T]he Court eventually . . . 
began to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained in the first eight 
Amendments.  [In doing so,] [t]he Court made it clear that the governing standard is not whether any ‘civilized 
system [can] be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.’  Instead, the Court inquired whether a 
particular Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice. . . .  The 
Court [also] abandoned ‘the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, 
subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’ . . .  Instead, the Court decisively held that 
incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment 
according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 & n.14, and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964))). 
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of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal), autrefois convict (a former conviction), and pardon.70  
The provision encompasses several protections.  Like the common-law plea of autrefois 
acquit,71 
                                                 
70  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978). 
 See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 & n.8 (1978); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 
71  See supra notes 13 & 17. 
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 it bars the government from prosecuting a person72 a second time for the same offense73 after he 
already has been acquitted.74  And like the common-law plea of autrefois convict,75 it prohibits 
                                                 
72  The word “person,” as used in the Double Jeopardy Clause, includes not only an individual human 
being, but also a corporation.  See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565, 575-76 (1977) 
(holding the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the defendant, a corporation, from being tried a second time for the 
same offense following a judgment of acquittal entered by the trial judge after the jury failed to reach a verdict); 
Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precluded the defendants, which included a corporation, from being tried a second time for the same offense 
following their midtrial acquittal by the trial judge).  For the sake of convenience, the Author will use the words 
“person” and “individual” interchangeably in the text, with each term encompassing both natural persons and 
corporations. 
73  For a discussion of what constitutes the “same offence” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, see 
RUDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 73-92. 
Although the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause mentions only harms to “life or limb,” the policies 
underlying the provision also apply when less severe penalties are involved.  Thus, it is “well-settled that the 
[Clause] covers imprisonment and monetary penalties,” Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 
769 n.1 (1994); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975) (“[T]he [Double Jeopardy] Clause has long been 
construed to mean something far broader than its literal language.”), and applies in proceedings involving 
misdemeanors, Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 167, 173, 178 (1874), municipal ordinance violations.  
Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 388, 395 (1970), and allegations of juvenile delinquency,  Breed, 421 U.S. at 
529-31, 541, as well as those involving felonies. 
74  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467, 473 (2005); Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 145-46 
(1986); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 437 (1981); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Scott, 437 U.S. at 88; 
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 73-75 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1978); Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 576; United States v. Sisson, 399 
U.S. 267, 289-91 & n.18 (1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Benton, 395 U.S. at 796-97; Fong Foo, 
369  U.S. at 143; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 
(1896). 
The protection against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment encompasses the principle of 
collateral estoppel, Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368 (1972) (per curiam); Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55,  
56 (1971) (per curiam); Simpson v. Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971 (per curiam); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 
443 445 (1970), or, to use the “more descriptive term[,] ‘issue preclusion.’”  Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 
119 n.4 (2009).  Accord Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 828 n.1 (2009) (“‘[R]eplac[ing] a more confusing lexicon,’ 
the term ‘issue preclusion,’ in current usage, ‘encompasses the doctrines [earlier called] “collateral estoppel” and 
“direct estoppel.”’” (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5 (2008))).  Issue preclusion means that “when 
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated 
between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.  Accord Bies, 556 U.S. at 834 (“Issue 
preclusion bars successive litigation of ‘an issue of fact or law’ that ‘is actually litigated and determined by a valid 
and final judgment, and . . . is essential to the judgment.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 
(1980))).  As a result, in addition to barring a subsequent prosecution fo the “same offence,” an acquittal also bars a 
subsequent prosecution for a different offense if “the second prosecution requires the relitigation of factual issues 
already resolved [in the defendant’s favor] by the first [trial].”  Brown, 432 U.S. at 166 n.6.  E.g., Turner, 407 U.S. 
at 368-69 (holding an individual’s acquittal of first-degree murder barred his subsequent prosecution for the robbery 
of the murder victim); Simpson, 403 U.S. at 386-87 (holding an individual’s acquittal of the armed robbery of a store 
barred his subsequent prosecution for the armed robbery of a customer of that occurred during the robbery of the 
store); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446-47 (holding an individual’s acquittal of armed robbery of one of six participants in a 
poker game barred his subsequent prosecution for the armed robbery of another participant in the same poker game).  
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the government from prosecuting an individual a second time for the same offense after he 
already has been convicted.76  In addition, it bars the government from imposing multiple 
punishments upon a person for the same offense in separate proceedings,77 and in some 
circumstances, it prohibits the government from prosecuting a person a second time for the same 
offense after a judge prematurely terminated the individual’s first trial, either by declaring a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The protection against a subsequent prosecution following an acquittal does not extend to an acquittal 
obtained in a court lacking jurisdiction over either the accused or the offense.  Ball, 163 U.S. at 669 (dictum) (“An 
acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is, . . .  like all proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and therefore 
no bar to subsequent indictment and trial in a court which has jurisdiction.”).  E.g., B.D.T. v. State, 738 N.E.2d 
1066, 1068-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Simeone, 294 A.2d 921, 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972).  It also 
may not apply to a fraudulently-obtained acquittal, see Aleman v. Honorable Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook 
County, 138 F.3d 302, 303 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the denial of habeas corpus relief to an individual being retried 
for murder following his acquittal in a bench trial conducted before a judge whom he bribed), aff’g sub nom. United 
States ex rel. Aleman v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 967 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1997); People v. Aleman, 667 
N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding an individual previously acquitted of murder in a bench trial could be 
retried for the same offense because he obtained the acquittal by bribing the trial judge), aff’g, Nos. 93 CR 28786, 93 
CR 28787, 1994 WL 684499 (Cir. Ct., Oct. 12, 1994) (interim ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss indictments), 
or one obtained following a “sham” trial.  See People v. Deems, 410 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ill. 1980). 
75  See supra note 17. 
76  United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.688, 697-98 (1993) (Scalia, J.) (finding of guilty rendered by the judge 
in a bench trial); id. at 720 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (same); id. at 744 
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (same); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 
(1977) (per curiam) (jury verdict of guilty); Brown, 432 U.S. at 165, 168 (guilty plea); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 
189-90 (1889) (guilty plea).  See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding the Double Jeopardy 
Clause barred the criminal prosecution of a juvenile for armed robbery after his previous adjudication of delinquency 
based upon the same armed robbery). 
A number of situations exist in which the government can try an individual a second time for the same 
offense despite his previous conviction for that offense.  For example, the government can retry an individual who 
succeeded in having his conviction set aside on appeal or collateral attack on the basis of trial error.  E.g., Lockhart 
v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (per curiam); United States v. Tateo, 
377 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1971); Ball, 163 U.S. at 672.  Similarly, in a jurisdiction with a two-tier system of trial 
courts, the government can retry an individual who was convicted in the first tier and who then elected to be tried de 
novo in the second tier.  Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 310-12 (1984); Ludwig v. 
Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 631 (1976).  The government also can retry an individual who was convicted in a 
court lacking jurisdiction of the person or the offense, State v. Perkins, 580 S.E.2d 523, 525-26 (Ga. 2003); 
Gallemore v. State, 312 S.W.3d 156, 161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010), for in such a situation the initial judgment of 
conviction is void.  See Ball, 163 U.S. at 669 (dictum).  In addition, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense when the defendant procured the conviction in the first trial through 
fraud or collusion.  People v. Malveaux, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 380-82 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Hazzard, 743 
S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).  See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 95-110. 
77  Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997). 
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mistrial78 or by dismissing the charges against him before the fact finder reached a verdict in the 
case.79 
 
B.  Reprosecution Following an Acquittal 
                                                 
78  United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1971) (plurality opinion) (concluding the double jeopardy 
provision prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial to allow several 
government witnesses the opportunity to consult with attorneys about their privilege against self-incrimination); 
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963) (holding the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial 
following the trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor’s request and over the defendant’s objection, 
because of the absence of a key government witness).  See generally RUDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 43-73. 
79  United States v. Gaytan, 115 F3d 737, 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding the defendant could not be 
retried after the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against him because of discovery violations by the 
prosecution); United States v. Govro, 833 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding the defendant could not be retried 
after the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against him because of his belief that a state supreme court 
decision barred the defendant’s prosecution because of the refusal of military police to administer a second 
intoxilyzer test to the defendant upon request);  State v. Bell, 753 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding the defendant could not be retried after the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against him because 
of the lack of credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses).  See also Scott, 437 U.S. at 98-99 (concluding that a 
“defendant [who] deliberately choos[es] to seek determination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to 
factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused . . . suffers no injury cognizable under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in favor of the 
defendant” and retry him if the appellate court finds the trial judge erred (emphasis added)). 
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On numerous occasions the Supreme Court has stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
accords “absolute finality”80 to an acquittal81 and consequently bars the government from trying 
an individual a second time for the same offense following his acquittal,82 whether the acquittal 
was rendered by a jury,83 a judge in a bench trial,84 or a judge in a jury trial.85  Moreover, the 
                                                 
80  Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).  Accord Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 152 n.2 
(1986); Lydon, 466 U.S. at 305; Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 
449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980). 
81  See also Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . . 
prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by a 
jury. . . .  [F]urther proceedings to secure [a conviction] are impermissible.”); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 
54, 64 (1978) (“That ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . [may] not be reviewed . . .  without putting [the defendant] twice in 
jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution’ has recently been described as ‘the most fundamental rule in the 
history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.’” (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 
(1977)) (some internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) (“[A] verdict of 
acquittal at the hands of the jury [is] not subject to review by motion for rehearing [or] appeal . . . .”); Fong Foo v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (“The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed 
. . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy and thereby violating the constitution.” (quoting Ball, 163 U.S. 
at 671 (bracketed material added by the Court))). 
82  Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986); Bullington, 451 U.S. at 
437; DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Scott, 437 U.S. at 88; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 64; Burks, 437 U.S. at 10-11; 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 576; United States v. 
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 290-91 & n.18 (1970); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784, 797 (1969); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 192 (1957); Ball, 163 
U.S. at 671. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause also bars a second trial when a defendant’s conviction is reversed by a 
reviewing court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.  Burks, 437 U.S. at 18 (concluding 
“the only ‘just’ remedy” in such a situation is for the reviewing court to “direct[] a judgment of acquittal”). 
83  Price, 398 U.S. at 329 (implied acquittal of charged greater offense by conviction for lesser offense); 
Benton, 395 U.S. at 797; Green, 355 U.S. at 198 (implied acquittal of charged greater offense by conviction for 
lesser offense); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671. 
84  Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904) (although the decision was based on a statute 
extending double jeopardy protection to the Philippines, not on the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court in 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 133 n.13, stated that it “has accepted [the] decision [in Kepner] as having correctly stated 
the relevant double jeopardy principles” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See also Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 
U.S. at 573 n.12 (dictum) (“In the situation where a criminal prosecution is tried to a judge alone, there is no 
question that the Double Jeopardy Clause accords his determination in favor of a defendant full constitutional 
effect.”). 
85  Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case in chief, the trial judge granted the 
defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty on one count of a three-count indictment); Sanabria, 437 U.S. 
at 64 (in a multi-defendant trial, the trial judge granted one defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal); Martin 
Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 (following the discharge of a hung jury, the trial judge granted the defendants’ 
motions for judgments of acquittal); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 142, 143 (the trial judge, apparently on his own motion, 
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finality of an acquittal applies even if “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.”86 
                                                                                                                                                             
“directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal”). 
86  Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143 (indicating the trial judge had no power to direct a verdict of acquittal under 
the circumstances, but nevertheless concluding the acquittal could not be reviewed without putting the acquitted 
defendants twice in jeopardy in violation of the Constitution).  Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Sanabria, 437 
U.S. at 64, 75, 78; Washington, 434 U.S. at 503.  See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he well established rule [is] 
that the bar [of the Double Jeopardy Clause] will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”); 
Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144 n.7 (“[T]he fact that the acquittal may result from erroneous evidentiary rulings or erroneous 
interpretations of governing legal principles . . . affects the accuracy of that determination but it does not alter its 
essential character.” (internal quotations marks omitted; alterations by the Court)); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132 (“It 
is acquittal that prevents retrial even if legal error was committed at the trial.”); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 (“[W]e . . . 
afford absolute finality to a jury’s verdict of acquittal–no matter how erroneous it decision . . . .” (emphasis 
deleted)); Green, 355 U.S. at 224 (“[I]t is one of the elemental principles of our criminal law that the [g]overnment 
cannot secure a new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.”). 
To be accorded this finality, however, the acquittal must be rendered in a court having jurisdiction over 
both the defendant and the offense.  For an acquittal rendered in a court lacking jurisdiction is “absolutely void,” 




In a bench trial, or when the judge intervenes in a jury trial, what constitutes an 
“acquittal” for purposes of the double jeopardy provision “is not controlled by the form of the 
judge’s action;”87 rather, a trial judge’s ruling constitutes an “acquittal” only when “the ruling of 
the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, in the defendant’s favor, correct or 
not, of all of the factual elements of the offense charged.”88  Under this definition, “a ruling [by 
the trial judge] that as a matter of law the [prosecution’s] evidence is insufficient to establish [the 
defendant’s] factual guilt [constitutes] an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”89 
                                                 
87  Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571.  Accord Scott, 437 U.S. at 96. 
88  Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 (brackets deleted)). 
89  Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144.  See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 467-68 (holding an order by the trial judge 
entering a required finding of not guilty in a jury trial, pursuant to a state rule of criminal procedure, meets the 
definition of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes); Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144 (“The category of acquittals 
includes ‘judgment[s] . . .  by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict.” (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 
(alterations by the Court))); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571-72 (“There can be no question that the 
judgments of acquittal entered here by the District Court were ‘acquittals’ in substance as well as form.”). 
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The Supreme Court has identified a number of related and often overlapping interests, 
both of the individual and of society as a whole, served by the rule according “absolute 
finality”90 to an acquittal and barring the government from prosecuting an individual a second 
time for the same offense following his trial and acquittal.  “A primary purpose served by [the 
guarantee against double jeopardy] is . . . to preserve the finality of judgments”91 and to protect 
the “integrity”92 of those judgments.93  Additionally, the guarantee serves to minimize the 
financial, psychological, and physical ordeal of the trial process,94 and it reduces the risk of 
erroneously convicting an innocent person95 by preventing the government from attempting to 
persuade a second fact finder of the individual’s guilt “after having failed with the first.”96  The 
rule against double jeopardy also protects the power of the jury, acting “as the conscience of the 
community in applying the law,”97 “to acquit against the evidence,”98 that is, to find the 
                                                 
90  Burks, 437 U.S. at 16.  Accord Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 152 n.2 (1986); Justices of Boston 
Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 305 (1984); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445 (1981); 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130. 
91  Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978).  Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (“It has been said that ‘a’ 
or ‘the’ ‘primary purpose of the [Double Jeopardy] Clause was ‘to preserve the finality of judgments’ . . . .” (quoting 
Crist, 437 U.S. at 33)).  See also Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 (“The public interest in the finality of criminal 
judgments is . . . strong . . . .”); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (“Where successive prosecutions are at 
stake, the guarantee [against double jeopardy] serves ‘a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit.’” 
(quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion))); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 
332, 352 (1975) (“Granting the Government . . . broad appeal rights would . . . disserve the defendant’s legitimate 
interest in the finality of a verdict of acquittal.”). 
92  Scott, 437 U.S. at 92. 
93  See infra text accompanying notes 224-36. 
94  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).  See infra text accompanying notes 255-68. 
95  Green, 355 U.S. at 188.  Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128, 130; Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 
215-16 (1978).  
96  Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352.  See infra text accompanying notes 291-309. 
97  Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 
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individual not guilty “even when its findings as to the facts, if literally applied to the law as 
stated by the judge, would have resulted in a conviction.”99 
                                                                                                                                                             
130. 
98  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130 n.11 (quoting Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: 
Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1063 (1980) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  See also Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What Purposes 
Do They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 358 (2002); Westen & Drubel, supra note 97, at 129-30. 
99  6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
22.1(g) (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter LAFAVE ET AL.].  See infra text accompanying notes 332-37. 
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In addition to those purposes expressly identified by the Supreme Court, the protection 
against double jeopardy serves a number of other purposes.  Not only does it help to prevent 
police and prosecutors from using the criminal process to harass an individual who already has 
been tried and acquitted for an offense,100 it also helps to conserve scarce prosecutorial and 
judicial resources,101 and assists in maintaining the public’s respect for, and confidence in, the 
criminal justice system.102  And by generally providing the government with “but one chance to 
convict a defendant[, it] operates as a powerful incentive to efficient and exhaustive 
investigation”103 and prosecution104 from the outset.105 
 
C.  Prosecution Appeals 
                                                 
100  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 3-4; AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER supra 
note 20, at 2; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.14.  See infra text accompanying notes 
344-48. 
101  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4.  See infra text accompanying notes 362-63. 
102  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4; Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1346 (H.L.), 1353 (Lord Devlin) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).  See infra text accompanying notes 371-76. 
103  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11.  See also FRIEDLAND, 
supra note 11, at 4  (“It is to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the police] should be directed.”); ENG. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.3. 
104  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4 (“It is to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the prosecutor] should be 
directed.”); Ian Dennis, Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Justice and Finality in Criminal Process, [2000] CRIM. L.R. 
933, 941. 
105  See infra text accompanying notes 385-89. 
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The Supreme Court has remarked that “the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause was to prevent successive trials, and not [g]overnment appeals per se.”106  Accordingly, 
if an appeal by the prosecution does not present a threat of successive prosecutions, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not offended.107  For example, that provision does not preclude the 
prosecution from appealing an acquittal ordered by a trial judge (or appellate court108) overruling 
a jury’s verdict of guilty, because in such a situation a new trial would not be necessary; rather 
the appellate court could merely reverse the trial judge’s decision, thereby reinstating the jury’s 
original verdict of guilty.109  For the same reason, the prosecution can appeal an acquittal when 
the judge in a bench trial finds the defendant guilty, but then sets aside that finding and enters a 
judgment of acquittal after concluding that some of the evidence on which he based his initial 
finding of guilt should not have been admitted into evidence and that, without that evidence, the 
                                                 
106  Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 (1978).  Accord  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1977) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause . . . was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, 
not at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial.” (quoting United States v. 
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 
U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause is not a complete barrier to an appeal by the prosecution in a 
criminal case.”); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 342 (“In the course of the debates over the Bill of Rights, there was no 
suggestion that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed any general ban on appeals by the prosecution.”). 
107  Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569-70.  Accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132. 
Of course, for the prosecution to appeal, local law must authorize that appeal.  For a brief overview of how 
Congress and the Supreme Court have dealt with prosecution appeals in the federal courts, see Wilson, 420 U.S.  at 
336-42. 
108  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005). 
109  United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).  See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (“When a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial 
judge (or an appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a judgment of acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does not preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of guilty.”); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130 
(“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a Government appeal from a ruling in favor of the defendant after a 
guilty verdict has been entered by the trier of fact.”); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352-53(“[W]hen a judge rules in favor of 
the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the trier of fact, the Government may appeal from that 
ruling without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).  E.g., United States v. Baggttt, 251 F.3d 1087, 1093 




prosecution failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.110  The Double 
Jeopardy Clause also does not bar the prosecution from appealing the sentence imposed on a 
convicted defendant, in part, because a revision of the defendant’s sentence would not require 
him to undergo a second trial.111 
                                                 
110  United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1978). 
111  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-38, 143. 
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When, however, reversal by the appellate court of an acquittal would lead either to a 
second trial112 or to “further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues 
going to the elements of the offense charged,”113 such as a resumption of the appellee’s trial,114 
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits an appeal by the prosecution.115  Smalis v. 
Pennsylvania116 is illustrative.  There, a husband and wife being tried in a bench trial for various 
offenses stemming from a suspicious fire in a building they owned challenged the sufficiency of 
the evidence by filing a demurrer at the close of the prosecution’s case.117  The trial court 
                                                 
112  Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1986); Scott, 437 U.S. at 91; Martin Linen Supply Co., 
430 U.S. at 570-71; Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336.  See also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132 (“[W]here a Government 
appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.” (quoting Martin 
Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 569-70)). 
113  Smalis, 476 U.S. at 146 (quoting Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 570-71 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
114  Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 (rejecting the prosecution’s contention that its appeal was permissible “because 
resumption of [the] petitioners’ bench trial following a reversal on appeal would simply constitute ‘continuing 
jeopardy.’”).  Cf.  Smith, 543 U.S. at 467 (holding that submission to the jury of a count on which the trial judge 
had reconsidered her initial midtrial ruling entering a required finding of not guilty subjected the defendant “to 
further factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence, prohibited by Smalis following an acquittal”). 
115  See also Smith, 543 U.S. at 469 n.4 (“[A]n acquittal, once final, may not be reconsidered on appeal or 
otherwise.”); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 (1978) (“[The] judgment of acquittal [for insufficient 
evidence], however erroneous, bars further prosecution . . . and hence bars appellate review of the trial court’s 
error.”); Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeal from [a judgment of] 
acquittal entered [by a trial court upon a motion by the defendant or upon the court’s own motion].”); Wilson, 420 
U.S. at 345 (“[A] verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury [is] not subject to review by . . . appeal . . . .”); United 
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (“The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or 
otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.”); Fong Foo v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (quoting Ball and reversing the issuance of a writ of mandamus 
that vacated the acquittal and ordered a new trial). 
116  476 U.S. 140 (1986). 
117  Id. at 141. 
At the time, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provided: 
1124.  Challenges to Sufficiency of Evidence 
(a) A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a conviction of one or more of the offenses charged by a: 
(1) demurrer to the evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth at the close of the Commonwealth’s 
case-in-chief; . . . . 
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sustained the demurrer on three of the charges, stating that after considering all the facts and 
reasonable inferences therefrom, it “‘was not satisfied . . . that there was sufficient evidence from 
which it could be concluded that either of the defendants was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.’”118  The prosecution then sought to appeal that ruling.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held the appeal could proceed,119 but on certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States 
disagreed.  The Court unanimously held the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the prosecution’s 
appeal120 because the trial judge’s ruling that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient as a 
matter of law to prove the factual guilt of the accused constituted an acquittal for double 
jeopardy purposes121 and reversal of that ruling would require “further factfinding proceedings 
going to guilt or innocence”122 that would place the defendants in jeopardy a second time for the 
same offense.123 
                                                                                                                                                             
See id. at 141 n.2. 
118  Id. at 141-42 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a-102a). 
119  Both a panel of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, see id. at 142, and the court en banc held the 
Double Jeopardy Clause barred the appeal.  Commonwealth v. Smalis, 480 A.2d 1046, 1051-52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1984).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, held otherwise.  Commonwealth v. Zoller, 490 A.2d 394 
(Pa. 1985) (consolidated with Smalis).  It concluded that “a demurrer is not the functional equivalent of an 
acquittal,” id. at 401, and therefore the prosecution could appeal from an order sustaining a defendant’s demurrer 
without violating the guarantee against double jeopardy.  Id. 
120  476 U.S. at 146. 
121  Id. at 144.   
122  Id. at 145. 
123  Id. at 145-46. 
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In reaching its result in Smalis, the Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that 
resumption of the Smalises’ bench trial following a successful appeal on the merits would 
“simply constitute ‘continuing jeopardy,’”124 reasoning that the trial judge’s acquittal of the 
Smalises terminated the initial jeopardy.125  The concept of continuing jeopardy relied upon by 
the State in Smalis was espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his dissenting opinion in 
Kepner v. United States.126  He stated: 
[I]t seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than 
once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried.  The 
jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause.  
Everybody agrees that the [double jeopardy] principle in its origin was a rule 
forbidding a trial in a new and independent case where a man already had been 
tried once.  But there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice in the same 
case.  It has been decided by this court that he may be tried a second time, even 
for his life, if the jury disagree, or, notwithstanding their agreement and verdict, if 
the verdict is set aside on the prisoner’s exceptions for error in the trial. . . . 
If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the government, I 
believe it would be impossible to maintain that the prisoner would be protected by 
the Constitution from being tried again.  He no more would be put in jeopardy a 
second time when retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would 
be when retried for a mistake that did him harm. . . .127 
 
Justice Holmes’s position, however, “has never been accepted by a majority of th[e] Court.”128 
                                                 
124  Id. at 145. 
125  Id. 
126  195 U.S. 100 (1904). 
127  Id. at 134-35 (citations omitted). 
128  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978).  Accord Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192 
(1957) (“[Justice Holmes’s] contention has been consistently rejected.”). 
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 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] system permitting review 
of all claimed legal errors would have symmetry to recommend it[129] and would avoid the 
release of some defendants who have benefitted from instructions or evidentiary rulings that are 
unduly favorable to them,”130 it has rejected that position, concluding “that the policies 
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the [g]overnment to appeal 
after a verdict of acquittal.”131  “Granting the [g]overnment such broad appeal rights,” the Court 
explained in United States v. Wilson,132 “would . . . disserve the defendant’s legitimate interest in 
the finality of a verdict of acquittal.”133  More importantly, though, a successful appeal “would 
allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt after 
having failed with the first; it would permit him to re-examine the weaknesses in his first 
                                                 
129  At least in felony cases, a convicted defendant generally can appeal his conviction, 7 LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 99, § 27.1 (“In the federal system and in most states, statutes (or state constitutional provisions) guarantee 
defendants in all felony cases a right to appellate review.  In a small number of states, review of felony convictions 
remains at the discretion of the state’s highest court, but the defendant has at least the opportunity to gain appellate 
review.” (footnotes omitted)); e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 6; 
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 601 to 615; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10 (McKinney 2005).  See generally 7 LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 99, §§ 27.1-27.2, 27.5-27.6 (3d ed. 2008), and, if successful, obtain a new trial.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 
615(b)(5); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.20 (McKinney 2009).  Ordinarily, if the defendant’s appeal succeeds, a 
second trial for the same offense does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.  United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 
671-72 (1896).  Accord Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1988); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 
(1970); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465-66 (1971) (articulating the rationale for allowing a second trial).  
But see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial when 
a defendant’s conviction is reversed by a reviewing court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the 
conviction). 
130  United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
131  Id. 
132  420 U.S. 332 (1975). 
133  Id. at 352.  See also Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986) (“When a successful 
postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the 
appeal has no proper purpose.  Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the interest of the accused in having an end 
to the proceedings against him.”). 
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presentation in order to strengthen the second,”134 and “would present an unacceptably high risk 
that the [g]overnment, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant . . . ,”135 
“thereby ‘enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’”136 
                                                 
134  Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352. 
135  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978). 
136  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 188 (1957)).  Accord Scott, 437 U.S. at 91. 
In Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978), the Supreme Court stated: 
[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause [does not] permit[] the Government to obtain 
relief from all of the adverse rulings–most of which result from defense 
motions–that lead to the termination of a criminal trial in the defendant’s favor.  
To hold that a defendant waives his double jeopardy protection whenever a trial 
court error in his favor on a midtrial motion leads to an acquittal would undercut 
the adversary assumption on which our system of criminal justice rests and 
would vitiate one of the fundamental rights established by the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). 
 IV.  THE ISSUE 
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The previous discussion indicates the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution from 
appealing an acquittal based upon a trial judge’s directed verdict of not guilty or its equivalent.  
For the purpose of such an appeal would be to obtain a reversal of the acquittal so the 
prosecution could try the defendant a second time for the same offense.  Indeed, several cases 
decided by the Supreme Court involved an attempt by the prosecution to obtain review of a 
court-ordered acquittal and therefore support this conclusion.137  But in all these cases, it was 
quite clear the “acquittal” by the trial judge was a final judgment.  No statute, rule of court, or 
prior court decision provided otherwise.  What if a state (or the federal government for that 
matter) enacted a statute or adopted a rule of court, based upon England’s Criminal Justice Act 
2003, providing that a trial judge’s pre-verdict decision to order an acquittal would not become 
“final” until the expiration of a specified period of time during which the prosecution could 
appeal that decision, and that if the prosecution availed itself of the opportunity to appeal, the 
trial judge’s decision would have no effect until either the appellate court denied leave to appeal, 
the prosecution abandoned the appeal before it was decided, or the appellate court decided the 
appeal adversely to the prosecution?  Under such a provision, the trial judge’s determination 
that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case would not immediately become a final 
judgment and therefore arguably would not constitute an “acquittal” for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.  Would the Double Jeopardy Clause still bar further proceedings in the matter 
going to guilt or innocence if the prosecution appealed the trial judge’s decision and the 
appellate court overturned that decision?  That is the question this Article will consider. 
                                                 
137  See Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145-46; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69, 78; United States v. Martin Linen Supply 




 V.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  A Trial Judge’s Reconsideration of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling:  Smith v. 
Massachusetts 
 
The argument that a jurisdiction in the United States could, consistent with the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, provide the prosecution with the right to appeal a directed verdict of not guilty 
can be based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Massachusetts,138 a case involving a 
trial judge’s reconsideration of her initial midtrial acquittal ruling on one, but not all, of the 
charges against the accused.  The facts in Smith were as follows: A grand jury returned an 
indictment charging Smith with three offenses: armed assault with intent to murder; assault and 
battery by means of a dangerous weapon; and unlawful  possession of a firearm,139 i.e., a 
weapon with a barrel less than sixteen inches in length.140  Smith elected to be tried by a jury, 
and at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief moved pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 25(a)141 for a required finding of not guilty on the firearm charge.142  He 
                                                 
138  543 U.S. 462 (2005). 
139  Id. at 464. 
The charges against Smith related to the shooting of his girlfriend’s cousin.  The state tried the girlfriend 
with Smith as an accessory after the fact.  Id. at 464-65. 
140  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 121 (West 2002) (defining a “firearm,” inter alia, for purposes of 
the offense of unlawfully possessing a firearm, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(a) (West 2000), as “a 
pistol, revolver or other weapon of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which a shot or bullet can be 
discharged and of which the length of the barrel or barrels is less than 16 inches or 18 inches in the case of a shotgun 
as originally manufactured . . . .”). 
141  Rule 25(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure provided: 
The judge on motion of a defendant or on his own motion shall enter a 
finding of not guilty of the offense charged in an indictment or complaint or any 
part thereof after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is 
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on the charge.  If a 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty is made at the close of the 
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claimed, in part, that the prosecution had not proved the barrel of the gun in question was less 
than sixteen inches.143  Although the victim had testified Smith “had shot him with ‘a pistol,’ 
specifically ‘a revolver’ that ‘appeared to be a .32 or a .38,’”144 the trial judge granted Smith’s 
motion during a sidebar conference, “reasoning that there was ‘not a scintilla of evidence’ that 
[Smith] had possessed a weapon with a barrel of less than 16 inches.”145  At the conclusion of 
the sidebar conference, the prosecution rested without moving to reopen its case to allow the 
victim to testify concerning the length of the gun’s barrel.146  The trial then continued, with 
Smith’s codefendant147 presenting one witness.148  After the defendants rested, and prior to 
closing arguments, the trial judge, who had not notified the jury of Smith’s acquittal on the 
firearm charge,149 reversed her ruling and allowed the jury to consider the firearm charge against 
Smith.150  The jury convicted Smith of all three offenses.151 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commonwealth's evidence, it shall be ruled upon at that time. . . . 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). 
142  543 U.S. at 465. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. (quoting App. 12, 14, available at 2004 WL2295575). 
145  Id. (quoting App. 21, available at 2004 WL2295575). 
The trial judge wrote on Smith’s motion “‘Filed and after hearing, Allowed.’”  Id. (quoting Consolidated 
Brief and Record Appendix for Defendant in No. 00-p-1215 (Mass. App. Ct.) p.  A. 21, App. 3, available at 2004 
WL2295575).  The granting of the motion was then entered on the docket.  Id. 
146  Id. at 465 & n.1. 
147  See supra note 139. 
148  543 U.S. at 465. 
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 466. 
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The jury acquitted Smith’s girlfriend, see supra note 139, of being an accessory after the fact, the lone 
charge she faced in the trial.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 788 N.E.2d 977, 980 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
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On certiorari,152 the Supreme Court of the United States reversed,153   The Court held 
the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the trial judge from reconsidering her midtrial acquittal 
ruling on the firearm-possession charge and submitting that charge to the jury.154  For the 
judge’s ruling constituted an “acquittal,”155 and “an acquittal, once final, may not be 
reconsidered on appeal or otherwise.”156  Submitting the charge to the jury, reasoned the Court, 
“plainly subjected [Smith] to further ‘factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence,’ 
prohibited by Smalis [v. Pennsylvania157] following an acquittal.”158 
In reaching its result, the Supreme Court first concluded that the trial judge’s order 
entering a finding of not guilty pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(a)159  
(that is, because “the evidence [introduced by the prosecution] is insufficient as a matter of law 
                                                 
152  The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed Smith’s conviction on the firearm charge, holding, inter 
alia, that the trial judge’s correction of her midtrial ruling did not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause because it 
did not subject Smith to a second trial or proceeding, and that Massachusetts Rule of  Criminal Procedure 25(a), see 
supra note 141, which mandates that a motion for a required finding of not guilty made at the close of the 
prosecution’s case “be ruled upon at that time,” MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a), did not preclude a trial judge from 
correcting her initial ruling.  Smith, 788 N.E.2d at 982-83.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied 
further review.  Commonwealth v. Smith, 797 N.E.2d 380 (Mass. 2003) (table). 
153  543 U.S. at 475. 
154  Id. at 473. 
155  Id. at 467-69, 470-72. 
156  Id. at 469 n.4.  See also id. at 467 (“[T]he double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury 
verdict.  This is so whether the judge’s ruling of acquittal comes in a bench trial or, as here, in a trial by jury.” 
(citations omitted)). 
157  476 U.S. 140 (1986), discussed supra text accompanying notes 116-25. 
158  543 U.S. at 467 (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)). 
159  See supra note 141. 
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to sustain a conviction”160) met the Court’s definition of an “acquittal,”161 as “it ‘actually 
represent[ed] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense 
charged.’”162 
                                                 
160  MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a). 
161  543 U.S. at 467-68. 
162  Id. at 468 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977)). 
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The Supreme Court next considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the trial 
judge from reconsidering her ruling,163 in other words, whether the “acquittal” on the firearm 
charge was final for purposes of the double jeopardy provision.  The Court noted at the outset of 
its analysis that the facts of the case did not give Smith any reason to doubt the finality of the 
trial judge’s ruling acquitting him of the firearm charge: the prosecutor did not move for 
reconsideration of the ruling or reserve such a motion;164 he did not request a continuance so he 
could provide favorable authority to the court;165 and the trial judge’s ruling did not “appear on 
its face to be tentative.”166  The Court then observed that at the time of Smith’s trial 
Massachusetts had not provided, either by statute or rule of court,167 or through a judicial 
decision,168 that a trial judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s 
                                                 
163  Id. at 467, 473. 
164   Id. at 470. 
165  Id. 
Near the end of its opinion, the Supreme Court observed that the prosecutor ultimately “convinced the 
[trial] judge to reconsider her acquittal ruling on the basis of legal authority he had obtained during a 15-minute 
recess before closing argument,” id. at 474, and stated that “[h]ad [the prosecutor] sought a short continuance at the 
time of the acquittal motion, the matter could have been resolved satisfactorily before [Smith] went forward with his 
case.”  Id. at 475. 
166  Id. at 470. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that Massachusetts procedure did not allow the trial judge to defer ruling on 
Smith’s motion, id. (citing MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a), quoted supra note 141), or to require the defendants to present 
their cases while the prosecution reserved the right to present more evidence.  Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Cote, 
444 N.E.2d 1282, 1290-91 (Mass. App. Ct. (1983)).  It also observed that “when the prosecutor suggested that he be 
given a chance to reopen his case before the defendants proceeded, the [trial] court rejected the suggestion because it 
was time to rule on [Smith’s] motion.”  Id. 
167  Id. at 471. 
The Supreme Court pointed out that the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure “provided that only 
clerical errors in a judgment or order, or errors ‘arising from oversight or omission’” could be corrected at any time.  
Id.. (citing MASS. R. CRIM. P. 42). 
168  Id. 
The prosecution had cited several Massachusetts decisions “supporting the general proposition,” id., that a 
trial judge could reconsider interlocutory rulings, such as rulings on pretrial motions and evidentiary rulings, but the 
Supreme Court found it “far from obvious that [the] principle [set forth in those cases] extends to entry of a required 
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evidence was not final and that the judge could later reconsider her decision.169  And while the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “[i]t might suffice for an appellate court to announce the 
state-law rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative in a case where reconsideration of the acquittal 
occurred at a stage in the trial where the defendant’s justifiable ignorance of the rule could not 
possibly have caused him prejudice,”170 it held that an appellate court could not do so in a case 
such as Smith, in which “the possibility of prejudice ar[o]se[]”171 because “the trial ha[d] 
proceeded to the defendant’s presentation of his case.”172  To allow a court to reconsider its 
                                                                                                                                                             
finding of not guilty . . . (or its common-law predecessor, the directed verdict)–which on its face, at least, purports 
not to be interlocutory but to end the case.”  Id. 
169  Indeed, the Supreme Court remarked that it could find no instance of any state having done so by 
statute or rule of court.  Id. at 470-71.  It did, however, say that some states had “held, as a matter of common law 
or in the exercise of their supervisory authority, that a court-directed judgment of acquittal,” id. at 471, does not 
become effective immediately upon its announcement by the trial judge.  Id. (citing Watson v. State, 410 So. 2d 
207, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam), as holding a court-directed judgment of acquittal becomes effective 
only at the conclusion of the hearing upon the defendant’s motion for such a judgment; Harden v. State, 287 S.E.2d 
329, 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), as holding a court-directed judgment of acquittal becomes effective only when the 
trial judge signs it and it is “entered in the docket”; and State v. Collins, 771 P.2d 350, 353 (Wash. 1989), as holding 
a court-directed judgment of acquittal becomes effective only when the trial court issues a formal order). 
170  Id.  
171  Id. at 472. 
172  Id. at 471. 
The Supreme Court identified two sources of potential prejudice.  First, the seeming acquittal on one 
charge might prejudice the accused by inducing him “to present a defense to the undismissed charges when he would 
be better advised to remain silent.”  Id. at 472.  Because many states “still follow the traditional rule that after trial 
or on appeal, sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are reviewed on the basis of the entire record, even if the 
defendant moved for acquittal when the prosecution rested and the court erroneously denied that motion,” id. a 
defendant in one of those states who introduced evidence on other counts following the trial judge’s required finding 
of not guilty might “‘bolster the [prosecution’s] case enough for it to support a verdict of guilty’” on the count on 
which he seemingly was acquitted.  Id.  (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).  For 
example,  “[t]he defendant’s evidence ‘may lay the foundation for otherwise inadmissible evidence in the 
[prosecution’s] initial presentation or provide corroboration for essential elements of the [prosecution’s] case.”  Id.  
(quoting United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164 n.1 (1954)).  At that point the trial judge might reverse her 
initial ruling because the entirety of the evidence introduced at the trial would support the defendant’s guilt on the 
initially dismissed count, and such decision would be upheld on appeal even though the judge’s original ruling was 
correct on the basis of the evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.  Second, “[i]n all jurisdictions, . . . false 
assurance of acquittal on one count may induce the defendant to present defenses to the remaining counts that are 
inadvisable–for example, a defense that entails admission of guilt on the acquitted count.”  Id.  The Court also 
noted that in multiple-defendant trials an apparent final dismissal of one defendant might cause the other defendants 
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initial ruling at that point, stated the Court, would allow the Double Jeopardy Clause’s guarantee 
“to become a potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it.”173 
                                                                                                                                                             
to alter their case in ways harmful to them.  The Court acknowledged, however, that “the potential effect upon 
codefendants had no bearing upon [the seemingly acquitted defendant’s] double-jeopardy claim,” id. at 472 n.6, 
although it stated that such a possibility “confirm[ed] the wisdom of the rule [it] adopted.”  Id. 
173  Id. at 473. 
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Two statements by the Supreme Court in Smith are highly relevant in determining 
whether a jurisdiction could constitutionally allow the prosecution to appeal a pre-verdict 
court-ordered acquittal.  First, the Court stated that “as a general matter state law may prescribe 
that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the [prosecution’s] proof can be 
reconsidered.”174   Second, it said that a midtrial acquittal need not be treated as final for double 
jeopardy purposes when “the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by 
preexisting rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of 
the evidence.”175  The four dissenters in Smith176 agreed with these statements by the majority, 
so, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissenting opinion, “[t]he Court unanimously”177 
concluded that “the Double Jeopardy Clause [does not] bar the States from allowing trial judges 
to reconsider a midtrial grant of a motion to acquit on one or more but fewer than all counts of an 
indictment[.]”178  Accordingly, the general rule that can be taken from these statements in Smith 
is that a jurisdiction “may provide for such reconsideration . . . by legislation or by judicial rule, 
common-law decision, or exercise of supervisory power.”179 
                                                 
174  Id. at 470 (emphasis added). 
175  Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
176  Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and 
Thomas joined.  Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy and Breyer. 
177  543 U.S. at 475 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
178  Id. 
179  Id.  E.g., People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793, 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the trial court did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when, after the defendant presented his case, it reconsidered its ruling that the 
prosecution had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt on one of several charges, because a 
previous state supreme court decision held that “a trial court may correct an erroneous ruling granting a motion for 
judgment of acquittal without offending the . . . Double Jeopardy Clause as long as it does so before the jury is 
dismissed and there had been no demonstrable prejudice to the defense”). 
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The lone exception to the general rule stated in the text would seem to be that an appellate court cannot 
announce a new rule and apply it to the case before it when the trial judge reconsidered her initial acquittal ruling 
after the defendant began presentation of his case.  See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.  Compare Price v. 
Vincent, 538 U.S. 634 (2003) (holding a habeas corpus petitioner was not entitled to relief because the state supreme 
court’s decision that the trial judge, in reconsidering his initial midtrial acquittal ruling before the defendant began 
presenting his case, and his submitting the charge to the jury, did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause was neither 
contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law). 
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B.  Double Jeopardy and Appeal of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling: Extending Smith 
The Supreme Court in Smith was concerned, of course, only with whether the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits a trial judge from reconsidering her initial ruling, made at the close of 
the prosecution’s case in chief, allowing the defendant’s motion for a court-ordered acquittal.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s statements and reasoning in Smith arguably can be extended to support 
the constitutional validity of a statute or rule of court, modeled upon the Criminal Justice Act 
2003,180 allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s decision to allow a defendant’s motion 
for a directed verdict of not guilty and permitting a new trial, or the resumption of the 
defendant’s initial trial, if the appeal results in the trial judge’s decision being overturned. 
                                                 
180  See supra text accompanying notes 29-62. 
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The Supreme Court in Smith concluded that the trial judge’s reconsideration of her 
midtrial ruling acquitting the accused of the firearm charge violated the Double Jeopardy Clause 
because the initial ruling was “final” and, as a result of her reconsideration, the accused was 
“subjected . . . to further factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence”181 on the firearm 
charge.182  The Court unanimously agreed, however, that if the state had previously provided by 
statute or otherwise that the such a midtrial acquittal ruling could be reconsidered by the trial 
judge, it would not have been final for double jeopardy purposes.183  The Criminal Justice Act 
2003 does just that with respect to an appeal by the prosecution of a ruling of no case to answer.  
It effectively provides that a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer, the functional equivalent of 
a directed verdict of not guilty or required finding of not guilty, is not immediately final.  
Rather, the prosecution is given the opportunity to inform the trial court “immediately after the 
ruling”184 that it “intends to appeal” the ruling,185 or, alternatively, that it desires an adjournment 
to decide whether to appeal.186  During the period in which the prosecution can inform the trial 
court it intends to appeal, the trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer has no effect,187 that is, is 
not yet final.  Moreover, should the prosecutor inform the trial court at the appropriate time that 
                                                 
181  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005). 
182  Id. at 469-73. 
183  Id. at 470, 473.  See supra text accompanying notes 174-79. 
184  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(1)(a), (2)(a) (Eng.) (adopted pursuant to 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 73(1), (2)(a) (Eng.)).  See supra notes 34 & 36. 
185  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(i). 
186  Id. § 58(4)(b).  See supra note 38. 
187  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(3). 
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it intends to appeal, the ruling continues to have no effect, i.e., is not final, during the time the 
appeal is pending.188  Thus, a trial judge’s ruling that the evidence in the prosecution’s case in 
chief fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt effectively becomes final 
only when one of the following events occurs: 1) the period during which the prosecution can 
inform the trial court it intends to appeal the ruling expires without the prosecution having 
informed the trial court of such an intention;189 2) the Court of Appeal denies leave to appeal 
after the prosecution informed the trial court in a timely manner that it intended to appeal;190 3) 
the prosecution abandons its appeal before the Court of Appeal determines the appeal;191 or 4) 
the Court of Appeal affirms the trial judge’s ruling.192 
                                                 
188  Id. § 58(10). 
189  This would occur almost at once if the prosecutor does not immediately inform the trial court either that 
it intends to appeal the ruling or that it desires an adjournment to consider whether to appeal.  See supra text 
accompany notes 184-86.  If the prosecution obtained an adjournment to decide whether to appeal, it generally 
would occur on the next business day following the adjournment.  See supra note 38. 
190  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4), (8), (9)(a). 
The ruling would also become final if the trial court denied leave to appeal and the prosecution decided not 
to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal.  See id. 
191  Id. § (8), (9)(b). 
192  Id. § 61(1), (3), (7). 
In theory, a ruling of no case to answer might not be final even after the Court of Appeal confirms the trial 
judge’s ruling.  For the Act provides that the prosecution can appeal further following an adverse decision by the 
Court of Appeal.  Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(1)-(2) (Eng.), as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 2003, 
§ 61(1), (3) (i) (allowing either party, with leave from the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, to appeal to the Supreme Court following an adverse ruling in the Court of Appeal, provided, however, 
that the Court of Appeal certifies “that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision and it 
appears to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the case may be) that the point is one which ought to be 
considered by the Supreme Court”).  In fact, however, as of May 20, 2012, neither the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, nor its predecessor, the House of Lords, see Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, Preamble, § 23, sch. 9, 
para. 16 (U.K.), has decided such an appeal. 
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 Under a statute or rule of court based upon the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a trial judge’s 
midtrial acquittal ruling would not be a “final judgment” of acquittal and, at least on its face, 
would not run afoul of the double jeopardy rule that “an acquittal, once final, may not be 
reconsidered on appeal.”193  Moreover, a statute or rule of court based upon the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 would be consistent with the Court’s unanimous view in Smith that a state can make 
what would otherwise be a “final” acquittal merely provisional for double jeopardy purposes.194  
In other words, a trial judge’s midtrial ruling that the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish a 
prima facie case arguably would not meet the Supreme Court’s definition of an “acquittal” for 
double jeopardy purposes because it would not be a ruling that “‘actually represents a resolution 
in the defendant’s favor, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense 
charged.”195  For the ruling would not at that point be final and, in effect, would not have 
“resolv[ed] or conclud[ed]”196–one way or the other–the dispute about any of the factual 
                                                 
193  Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469 n.4. (2005) (emphasis added).  See also Blueford v. 
Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. ___, ___ (2012), 2012 WL 1868066, at *5  (May 24, 2012) (“The foreperson’s report [to the 
trial judge that the jury had unanimously voted against convicting the defendant of capital murder and first-degree 
murder] was not a final resolution of anything. . . .  The fact that deliberations continued after the report deprives 
the report of the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal on the murder offenses [for purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause].” (emphasis added)); id. at ___, 2012 WL 1868066, at *6 (“[T]he foreperson’s report [to the trial 
judge that the jury had unanimously voted against convicting the defendant of capital murder and first-degree 
murder] prior to the end of deliberations lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses . . . 
.” (emphasis added)); id. at ___, 2012 WL 1868066, at *6 (“Blueford . . . overlooks the real distinction between [his 
case and Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970)]: In Green and 
Price, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson [to the trial judge] was not.” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (“‘If the innocence of the accused has 
been confirmed by a final judgment [of acquittal], the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would 
be unfair.’” (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (emphasis added)); Swisher v. Brady, 438 
U.S. 204, 214 (1978) (same). 
194  See supra text accompanying notes174-79. 
195  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 
U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (emphasis added and brackets deleted)).  Accord Smith, 543 U.S. at 468. 
196  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1494 (5th ed. 2011) (defining 
“resolution” as, inter alia, “[t]he resolving or concluding of a dispute or disagreement”).  See also id. 
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elements of the offense in question.197  In addition, a preexisting statute or rule of court would 
satisfy the Supreme Court’s concern in Smith about the accused’s lack of notice that the trial 
judge’s initial ruling was not final.198  For the statute or rule of court would have provided such 
notice.199 
                                                                                                                                                             
(defining”resolve” as, inter alia, “[t]o bring to a usually successful conclusion . . . .”). 
197  Cf. Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at ___,  2012 WL 1868066, at *5 (“The foreperson’s report [to the trial judge 
that the jury had unanimously voted against convicting the defendant of capital murder and first-degree murder] was 
not a final resolution of anything.”). 
198  See Smith, 543 U.S. at  470 (“It is important to note, at the outset, that the facts of this case gave the 
petitioner no reason to doubt the finality of the state court’s ruling.”); id. at 473 (“If, after a facially unqualified 
midtrial dismissal of one count, the trial has proceeded to the defendant’s introduction of evidence, the acquittal 
must be treated as final, unless the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by preexisting rule or 
case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence.” (emphasis added)).  See 
also id. at 471-72 (in a case in which the trial judge reconsidered her initial midtrial acquittal ruling after the trial had 
proceeded to the presentation of the defendant’s case on the undismissed charges, concluding an appellate court 
cannot announce a new rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative, because of the possibility of prejudice to the 
accused, who was “justifiabl[y] ignoran[t],” i.e., lacked notice, of the rule). 
199 Cf. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) (“The defendant, of course, is charged with 
knowledge of the statute and its . . . provisions [authorizing the Government to appeal a convicted defendant’s 
sentence], and has no expectation of finality in his sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has 
expired.”); id. at 139 (“[W]here . . . Congress has specifically provided that the sentence [of a convicted defendant] 
is subject to appeal[,] . . . there can be no expectation of finality in the original sentence.”); id. .at 137 (“Respondent 
was . . . aware [from the statute] that a dangerous special offender sentence is subject to increase on appeal. 
[Therefore] [h]is legitimate expectations are not defeated if his sentence is increased on appeal . . . .”). 
Under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a person being tried for a criminal offense knows at 
the outset of his trial that if the trial judge rules he has no case to answer and the prosecution informs the judge it 




But are there any differences between, on one hand, allowing a trial judge to reconsider 
her midtrial acquittal ruling and, on the other hand, allowing an appellate court to review such a 
ruling, differences that would preclude extending the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith?  
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissenting opinion in Smith, thought so.  She expressly distinguished 
the two situations.  She believed a trial judge’s reconsideration of a midtrial acquittal ruling 
would not constitute a double jeopardy violation (at least in the absence of any prejudice to the 
accused’s defense200) because further proceedings in the case would merely be “continuing 
proceedings before the initial tribunal prior to rendition of a final adjudication.”201  
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg also thought the “Double Jeopardy Clause bars appellate review 
of a trial court’s grant of a motion to acquit, because reversal would lead to a remand for further 
trial proceedings.”202  She stated that “[a]n appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, moves a 
case from a court of first instance to an appellate forum, and necessarily signals that the trial 
court has ruled with finality on the appealed issue. . . .”203  The majority of the Court disagreed 
with Justice Ginsburg’s position that the trial judge’s reconsideration of her midtrial acquittal 
ruling in Smith did not violate the guarantee against double jeopardy because “the acquittal was 
reconsidered ‘before the court of first instance ha[d] disassociated itself from the case or any 
issue in it.’”204 However, it seemed to agree with Justice Ginsburg “that the taking of an appeal 
                                                 
200  See Smith, 543 U.S. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
201  Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
202  Id. at 477(emphasis added). 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 469 n.4 (opinion of the Court) (quoting id. at 477-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
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‘necessarily signals’ the finality of the order appealed.”205 
The Justices, of course, are correct when they state that a trial judge’s order must be final 
for it to be appealable: “‘Finality as a condition of review is [a] . . . characteristic of . . . appellate 
procedure . . . ’”206 in the United States.207  But an order need not be a “final judgment,” i.e., one 
that “terminates the criminal proceedings in the [trial] court,”208 to be “final” for purposes of 
appeal.  Rather, a “final decision,” that is, one that “constitute[s] a complete, formal, and, in the 
trial court, final [determination] of a [party’s] . . . claim,”209 may sometimes be appealable.  For 
example, in Abney v. United States,210 the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a federal 
criminal prosecution could immediately appeal a trial judge’s pretrial ruling denying a motion to 
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, despite the ruling’s not being a “final 
judgment.”211  By expressly stating that the taking of an appeal signals the finality of the order 
being appealed, the majority in Smith seemed to distinguish between a final order, or decision, 
and a final judgment. 
                                                 
205  Id. 
206  Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610 (2009) (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940)). 
207  4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review §§ 79, 202 (2007). 
208  Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977). 
209  Id. at 659 (emphasis added). 
210  431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
211  Id. at 657, 662. 
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Accordingly, because “‘there are instances in which a final decision is not a final 
judgment,’”212 a statute or rule of court arguably could, within the framework of current 
principles governing appeals, provide that: 1) a trial judge’s midtrial determination that the 
prosecution’s evidence fails to establish a prima facie case of guilt does not become effective 
immediately, i.e., is not a “final judgment” acquitting the defendant–in which case it would not 
bring into play the double jeopardy principles governing a “final” judgment of acquittal;213 2) as 
a “final decision,” the trial judge’s ruling may be appealed by the prosecution; and 3) if the 
appellate court overturns the trial judge’s ruling, the defendant’s trial can be resumed or he can 
be tried a second time for the same offense.  This is precisely what Parliament did in England in 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003,214 and what the legislatures did in those other countries that 
recognize the protection against double jeopardy yet permit the prosecution to appeal an 
acquittal.215 
                                                 
212  Id. at 658 (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (separate opinion of Jackson, J.)). 
213  See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469 n.4. (2005) (“An acquittal, once final, may not be 
reconsidered on appeal.” (emphasis added)); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (“‘If the 
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment [of acquittal], the Constitution conclusively 
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.’” (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (emphasis 
added)); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 214 (1978) (same). 
214  See supra text accompanying notes 15-19 & 184-92. 
215  See supra text accompanying notes 20-26. 
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In effect, a statute or rule of court based upon the Criminal Justice Act would create a 
two-tiered process for the midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s 
evidence.  If the trial judge finds the prosecution did not establish a prima facie case of guilt, 
that decision is not immediately final and may be appealed by the prosecution.  If the 
prosecution avails itself of the opportunity to appeal, the ultimate decision on the sufficiency of 
the prosecution’s evidence will be made by the appellate court.216  Such a procedure arguably 
would be constitutionally permissible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Swisher v. 
Brady.217  In that case, the Court found no double-jeopardy violation in a juvenile court 
procedure under which the state, in a delinquency proceeding, could obtain a trial de novo by a 
juvenile court judge if it filed exceptions to a master’s proposed findings and recommendations 
that favored the juvenile.  In reaching this result, the Court stated that “it is for the States . . . to 
designate and empower the factfinder and adjudicator.”218  Subsequently, in Smith v. 
Massachusetts,219 the Supreme Court explained that the result in Swisher was “a recognition that 
the initial jeopardy does not end until there is a final decision.”220  Arguably, a statute or rule of 
court based upon the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would do no more than designate the appellate 
court as “the factfinder and adjudicator”221 of a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty in 
                                                 
216  If the trial judge ruled against the defendant, i.e., found the prosecution’s case sufficient to establish the 
defendant’s guilt, that decision would stand for purposes of the trial, but, as under current practice, see, e.g., Burks v. 
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 3 (1978), the defendant could challenge the trial court’s ruling on appeal, if he is 
ultimately convicted by the jury. 
217  438 U.S. 204 (1978). 
218  Id. at 216. 
219  543 U.S. 462 (2005). 
220  Id. at 469 n.4. 
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those cases in which the trial judge decided the motion in favor of the accused and the state 
appealed.  In such cases, a decision by the trial judge to allow the defendant’s motion would not 
be final, unless the state decided to accept the trial judge’s decision and not appeal.222 
                                                                                                                                                             
221  Swisher, 438 U.S. at 216. 
222  Even if the state appealed, the trial judge’s decision might become final if the state failed to obtain 
leave to appeal or abandoned its appeal before the appellate court decided it.  See supra text accompanying notes 
190-91. 
As the above analysis indicates, a statute or rule of court authorizing the prosecution to 
appeal a midtrial decision by a trial judge to direct a verdict of not guilty may be consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause.  Nevertheless, the final 
decision about the constitutionality of such a statute or rule of court must depend upon how it 
comports with the policies underlying the guarantee against double jeopardy.  The remainder of 
this section of the Article will examine that question. 
 
C.  Appeal of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling and the Policies Underlying the Guarantee 




As previously stated, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against prosecuting an 
acquitted individual a second time for the same offense serves a number of interrelated 
interests.223  This section of the Article will examine how each of the policies underlying the 
Clause applies in the context of a statute or rule of court, based upon the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s decision to order a midtrial acquittal. 
 
1.  Preserving the Finality of Judgments 
                                                 
223  See supra text accompanying notes 91-105. 
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The Supreme Court has stated “that ‘a’ or ‘the’ ‘primary purpose’ of the [Double 
Jeopardy] Clause was ‘to preserve the finality of judgments,’ or the ‘integrity’ of judgments.”224  
Once an individual has been acquitted of an offense, the government must respect that judgment 
and cannot later bring a second prosecution against the same individual for the same offense, 
even if it disagrees with the result in the first trial. 
Preserving the finality of a judgment by prohibiting a second prosecution for the same 
offense following an acquittal serves the “public interest”225 in a number of ways.  For example, 
according absolute finality to a judgment of acquittal helps to conserve scarce prosecutorial and 
judicial resources.226  It also helps to maintain the public’s respect for, and confidence in, the 
legal system,227 and encourages efficient investigation and prosecution of crimes.228  The 
English Law Commission described another public interest served by according absolute finality 
to a judgment of acquittal when it stated: 
The finality involved in the rule against double jeopardy . . . represents an 
enduring and resounding acknowledgement by the state that it respects the 
principle of limited government and the liberty of the subject.  The rule against 
double jeopardy is, on this view, a symbol of the rule of law and can have a 
pervasive and educative effect.  The rule serves to emphasise commitment to 
                                                 
224  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 
(1978), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (citations deleted)).  See also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
161, 165 (1977) (“Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee [against double jeopardy] serves ‘a 
constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit.’” (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 
(1971) (plurality opinion)). 
225  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978)  (“The public interest in the finality of criminal 
judgments is so strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though ‘the acquittal was based upon an 
egregiously erroneous foundation.’” (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam))).   
226  See infra text accompanying notes 362-63. 
227  See infra text accompanying notes 371-76. 





                                                 
229  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.17. 
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According absolute finality to a judgment of acquittal also serves personal interests.  An 
acquitted individual, as well as his family and friends,230 need not “live in a continuing state of 
anxiety and insecurity,”231 fearful that, despite the acquittal, the government will again drag him 
into court a second time and require him to defend himself against the same charge.232  Absent 
such a limitation, a person acquitted of a crime could never be sure the matter had ended, no 
matter how many times a trier of fact found him not guilty, for the government could continue to 
prosecute him again and again and again until it found a fact finder that would convict. 
In addition to serving as an “antidote to distress and anxiety,”233 according finality to a 
judgment of acquittal allows the acquitted individual to consider the matter closed and to plan 
his future accordingly.  In this “important sense,”234 stated the English Law Commission, 
“finality as a value . . .  impact[s] . . .  individual liberty or autonomy.”235  The Commission 
explained: 
                                                 
230  As the English Law Commission recognized, “[t]here is some value in protecting certain third party 
interests by finality of criminal proceedings, [such as] the emotional and financial interests of an acquitted person’s 
family and dependants.”  Id. para. 4.16.  See also AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra 
note 20, at 3 (paraphrasing the English Law Commission and stating “the interests of finality also affect friends, 
family and others dealing with the person concerned”). 
231  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
232  Id.; ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.9 (“In a serious case 
the prospect of going through the trial process at some future date is likely to cause great anxiety . . . .  At least 
some acquitted defendant will be prey to a constant and persisting sence of doubt.”); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL 
CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 20, at 3 (“[T]hose subject, or potentially subject, to any double jeopardy 
should not be subjected to the anxiety and distress occasioned by the fear that he or she may have to undergo the 
admittedly stressful trial process all over again.”). 
233  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.11. 
234  Id. para. 4.12. 
235  Id. 
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In a liberal democracy, it is a fundamental political and social objective to allow 
individuals as much personal autonomy as possible, to allow people the space to 
live their own lives and pursue their visions of a good life.  Lack of finality in 
criminal proceeding infringes on this to a significant degree, in that the individual, 
though acquitted of a crime, is not free thereafter to plan his or her life, enter into 
engagements with others and so on, if required constantly to have in mind the 
danger of being once more subject to a criminal prosecution for the same alleged 
crime.236 
  
                                                 
236  Id. 
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A statute or rule of court based upon the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would not contravene 
the policy of maintaining the finality of judgments, at least insofar as finality protects personal 
interests.237  For such a statute or court rule would provide that a trial judge’s midtrial ruling 
that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt has no effect 
during the period in which the prosecution can decide whether to appeal the ruling,238 and if it 
does appeal, during the pendency of that appeal.239  Moreover, it would provide that the trial 
judge cannot “take any steps in consequence of the ruling,”240 and if she does take any steps, 
those steps are also to have no effect.241  As a result of these provisions, a trial judge’s decision 
to direct a verdict of not guilty would not become “final,” and the trial judge could not enter a 
valid final judgment of acquittal in the case, until either the period within which the prosecution 
can inform the trial judge of its intention to appeal the ruling expires without the prosecution’s 
having notified the trial court it intends to appeal,242 or, if the prosecution informs the judge in a 
timely manner that it intends to appeal the ruling, leave to appeal is not obtained,243 or, if leave is 
                                                 
237  The discussion that immediately follows in the text focuses primarily on the personal interests served 
by preserving the finality of a judgment of acquittal.  Subsequent subsections will focus separately on particular 
public interests served by according absolute finality to a judgment of acquittal.  See infra text accompanying notes 
364-70 (conserving scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources), notes 375-82 (maintaining the public’s respect for, 
and confidence in, the legal system), and notes 388-400 (encouraging efficient investigation and prosecution of 
crimes). 
238  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(3)-(4) (Eng.). 
239  See id. § 58(1). 
240  See id. § 58(11)(b). 
241  See id. § 58(11)(c). 
242  See id. § 58(3)-(4). 
243  Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the prosecution must obtain leave to appeal, either from the trial 
judge or the Court of Appeal.  See id. § 57(4).  A ruling of no case to answer therefore would, in effect, become 
“final” (i.e., the defendant would be acquitted of the offense in question) if, and when, the prosecution failed to 
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granted, either the prosecution abandons the appeal,244 or the appellate court upholds the trial 
judge’s ruling that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case of guilt.245  
Consequently, until one of these events occurs, there is no judgment whose “finality”246 must be 
preserved247 or whose “integrity”248 must be protected.249  Moreover, every criminal defendant 
would know at the outset of his trial that, should the trial judge find at the conclusion of the 
prosecution’s case in chief (or at any time thereafter before the case is submitted to the jury) that 
the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt, that decision will not be final, and 
will not immediately acquit him of the offense in question.250  He also would know that if the 
prosecution appealed the trial judge’s ruling and succeeded in overturning the trial judge’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
obtain leave to appeal.  For, pursuant to the terms of the required “acquittal agreement” undertaken by the 
prosecution as a condition of taking the appeal, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, “the defendant . . . [must] 
be acquitted of [the] offence [in question] if [leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is not obtained].”  Criminal 
Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)-(9)(a). 
244  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)-(9)(b). 
245  See id. §§ 58(10)-(11), 61(1), (3), (7). 
As explained earlier, in theory, a ruling of no case to answer might not be final under the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 even after the Court of Appeal confirms the trial judge’s ruling.  For the Act provides that the prosecution 
can appeal to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom following an adverse decision by the Court of Appeal.  See 
supra note 192. 
246  Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978). 
247  See supra text accompanying note 224. 
248  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). 
249  See supra text accompanying note 224. 
250  Cf. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 473 (2005) (“If, after a facially unqualified midtrial 
dismissal of one count [because of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence], the trial has proceeded to the 
defendant’s introduction of evidence [on another count of the indictment], the acquittal must be treated as final 
[under the Double Jeopardy Clause], unless the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by 




ruling, his trial could be resumed,251 or he could be subjected to a new trial for the same 
offense.252 
On the other hand, once a court-ordered acquittal became “final” and the defendant was 
acquitted of the offense in question,253 the Double Jeopardy Clause would protect the 
now-acquitted individual from a second prosecution for the same offense.  Moreover, by 
continuing to recognize that it could not bring a second prosecution for the same offense 
following a final judgment of acquittal, the state would still acknowledge “that it respects the 
principle of limited government and the liberty of the subject.”254 
 
2.  Minimizing the Ordeal of the Trial Process 
                                                 
251  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(a) (Eng.).. 
252  See id. § 61(4)(b). 
253  See supra text accompanying notes 242-45. 
254  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.17.  See supra text accompanying notes 
229 & 233-36. 
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Another purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent “the State with all its 
resources and power [from] . . . mak[ing] repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal.”255  As Professor 
Glanville Williams explained, it would be “hard on the defendant if, after he has at great cost in 
money and anxiety secured a favorable verdict from a jury on a particular issue, he must fight the 
battle over again.”256 
                                                 
255  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).  Accord Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 
(1977) (“[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual that, among other things, he will not be 
forced, with certain exceptions, to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial 
more than once for the same offense.”). 
256  WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 164.  Although Professor Williams was writing about a subsequent 
prosecution for a different offense, but one arising out of the same facts as the first, “clearly the principle also applies 
to true autrefois cases,” ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.6 n.14, i.e., a 
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.  See supra notes 13 & 17. 
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As these statements indicate, defending oneself against a criminal charge can be an 
arduous task for a person.  For one thing, it can place a heavy financial burden on him.257  
Those who can afford it nearly always hire an attorney to represent them.258  They also may hire 
an investigator to help locate witnesses and find evidence favorable to their defense, and may 
employ experts and other specialists to assist in the preparation of their case and to testify in 
their behalf at the trial.  Even in cases in which the accused is indigent and entitled to legal 
assistance from the state,259 he can still suffer a financial burden.  For example, if he is 
employed, he may miss time at work to appear in court or to meet with his lawyer to help 
prepare his defense, or he might even lose his job because of the pending criminal charges.260 
                                                 
257  According to a long-time criminal defense lawyer in Chicago, a private attorney charges 
$15,000-$20,000 to represent an individual in an armed robbery case in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
the exact amount depending on such things as whether the individual is being held in jail or is free on bond, the type 
of motions that will need to be filed, and the individual’s background.  In addition to the attorney’s fee, there might 
be investigative expenses.  E-mail from Richard Kling, Clinical Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to 
David S. Rudstein, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (May 13, 2012, 11:02 CDT) (on file with 
author).  See also Susan Chandler, Free Ryan Defense Could Get Expensive If Mistrial Declared, Rerun Would Be 
Costly, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 30, 2006, at Business 1, available at 2006 WLNR 7238109 (stating the defense 
costs in the fraud trial of former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan stood at $10 million as of November of 2005, and 
noting that the defendant’s lead lawyer bills at the rate of $750 per hour); Kristi Pihl, Franklin May Have to Turn to 
Reserves to Cover Trial Costs, TRI-CITY HERALD (Kennewick, Wash.), Apr. 19, 2011, at B1, available at 2011 
WLNR 7707015 (stating that public defense costs for the year in four pending murder cases stood at $17,528 as of 
April 2011, and $66,695 since 2010, the bulk of which were for attorney’s fees, with public defense attorneys being 
paid at the regular rate of $75 per hour). 
258  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[T]here are few defendants charged with crime, 
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can to prepare and present their defenses.”). 
259  See, e.g., id. at 339-45 (holding an indigent defendant charged with a felony is constitutionally entitled 
to counsel at state expense); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding an indigent defendant charged 
with a misdemeanor, petty offense, or felony cannot be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel at trial); Ake 
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that when an indigent “defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that 
his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the 
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, 
preparation, and presentation of the defense”). 
260  See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT 77: DIRECTED VERDICTS OF ACQUITTAL 
para. 2.12 (1996) [hereinafter N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77] (stating that even in cases in which the 
accused is entitled to legal aid, “the financial burden can still be felt by the accused in other substantial ways, for 
example, the disruption to normal employment or business”). 
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Defending oneself in a criminal prosecution also can cause stress to an individual, 
affecting him, as well as his family,261 both emotionally and physically.  A criminal charge 
generally embarrasses the accused,262 and it may cause his friends, neighbors, colleagues, and 
even relatives to disapprove of him, be suspicious and distrustful of him, and perhaps even shun 
him.  Additionally, an accused who has a family and a job will likely be concerned about the 
effect the pending charge–and possible conviction–will have on his family life and employment.  
Perhaps even more importantly, though, the individual will be concerned about his impending 
trial and the possibility he will be convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  These 
various concerns may exact not only a psychological toll on the accused, but a physical one as 
well.263 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Law Reform Commission of New South Wales, whose work product is cited in this and subsequent 
notes, was established by the Law Reform Commission Act 1967.  Law Reform Commission Act 1967 (NSW.) 
(Austl.).   It comprises a Chairman and at least two other members, all appointed by the Governor.  Id. § 3(2).  Its 
purpose is, with references made to it, “to consider the law, enacted or promulgated by the Legislature of New South 
Wales . . . with a view to, or for the purpose of: (i) eliminating defects and anachronisms in the law, (ii) repealing 
obsolete or unnecessary enactments, (iii) consolidating, codifying or revising the law, (iv) simplifying or 
modernising the law by bringing it into accord with current conditions, (v) adopting new or more effective methods 
for the administration of the law and the dispensation of justice, (vi) systematically developing and reforming the 
law,” id. § 10(a), and to “consider proposals relating to matters in respect of which it is competent for the Legislature 
of New South Wales . . . to enact or promulgate laws.”  Id. § 10(b). 
261  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.7. 
262  See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 
(1957). 
263  Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975). 
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This “‘heavy personal strain’”264 inevitably accompanies any criminal charge, as does the 
expense that must be borne by a defendant who is not indigent.  The Double Jeopardy Clause, 
however, is intended, in part, to minimize the expense, distress, and trauma to an individual 
accused of a crime by confining it, in most cases,265 to that arising from a single trial.266  An 
individual who is acquitted,267 or convicted,268 of a particular offense need never again have to 
undergo the ordeal of the trial process for that same offense.  A statute or rule of court allowing 
the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal ruling could frustrate this purpose, 
because, at a minimum, it would require some defendants to endure the rigors of the appellate 
process before the trial judge’s ruling can take effect and they can be formally acquitted, and at 
the extreme, by compelling some defendants to undergo a second trial for the same offense if the 
prosecution succeeds in its appeal. 
                                                 
264  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
265  Second trials for the same offense are sometimes permitted by the Double Jeopardy Clause  See supra 
notes 76 & 129, and infra note 279 and text accompanying notes 279-82 & 320.  See generally RUDSTEIN, supra 
note 20, at 132-48. 
266  Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).  Accord Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 
n.4 (1986); Breed, 421 U.S. at 529-30. 
267  See supra text accompanying notes 72-74. 
268  See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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In those cases in which the prosecution decides to appeal the trial judge’s decision to 
direct a verdict of not guilty the seemingly-acquitted defendant will have to “defend” himself in 
the appellate court.  If he is not indigent, he “is likely to carry an enormous burden if, in 
addition to defending himself or herself at trial, the additional expense of an appeal . . .  is to be 
borne.”269  Even if the defendant is represented by appointed counsel,270 he may bear a heavy 
financial burden during the pendency of the appeal because of the continued disruption to his 
employment or business.271 
                                                 
269  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.12. 
An attorney retained by an individual on a flat-fee basis to conduct the individual’s defense at trial, see 
supra note 257, will charge an additional fee to represent the individual on an interlocutory appeal.  E-mail from 
Richard Kling, Clinical Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, to David S. Rudstein, Professor of Law, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law (May 21, 2012, 11:00 CDT) (on file with author).  If the trial attorney were retained 
on an hourly basis, see supra note 257, the hours would continue to mount as the attorney worked to respond to the 
prosecution’s appeal.  It is also possible that the trial attorney would not represent the defendant in the appeal, so 
the defendant would have to hire an attorney specializing in appeals to represent him in the appellate court. 
270  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-584 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective May 9, 2012) 
(“A. The public defender shall, on order of the court, defend, advise and counsel any person who is entitled to 
counsel as a matter of law and who is not financially able to employ counsel in the following proceedings and 
circumstances: 1. Offenses triable in the superior court or justice courts at all stages of the proceedings . . . . 7. 
Appeals to a higher court or courts.”);  N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717 (McKinney 2004) (“1. The public defender shall 
represent, without charge, at the request of the defendant, or by order of the court with the consent of the defendant, 
each indigent defendant who is charged with a crime . . . in the county or counties in which such public defender 
serves.  When representing an indigent defendant, the public defender shall counsel and represent him at every 
stage of the proceedings following arrest, shall initiate such proceedings as in his judgment are necessary to protect 
the rights of the accused, and may, in his discretion, prosecute any appeal, if in his judgment the facts and 
circumstances warrant such appeal. (emphasis added)). 
271  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.12. 
Assuming the prosecution obtains leave to appeal, see supra notes 4 & 32, the severity of this financial 
burden may depend upon the length of time it takes the appellate court to decide the appeal.  In England, under the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, some defendants have had to wait over six months for the Court of Appeal to decide an 
appeal by the prosecution of a trial judge’s ruling.  R v. M.H., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1508, [3], [38] (Eng.) (219 
days); R v. S.H., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 1931, [1], [44], [64]. [2011] 1 Crim. App. 14, at 184, 195, 201 (Eng.) (386 
days); R v. W., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 927, [1], [42] (no jur. given) (214 days); R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, 
[9], [15], [2010] 2 Crim. App. 12, at 87, 89 (Eng.) (230 days); CPS v. Mattu, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1483, [1], [22] 
(Eng.) (232 days); R v. M.K., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 952, [1], [8], [21], [27], [30] (Eng.) (324 days); R v. L., [2008] 
EWCA (Crim) 1970, [6]-[7], [36]-[37], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 16, at 232, 233, 242 (Eng.) (212 days); R v. N.W., 
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 2, [1], [39] (Eng.) (271 days); R v. P., [2007] EWCA (Crim) 3484, [1]-[2], [13] (Eng.) 
(somewhere around 319 days). 
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One must remember, however, that a trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal normally 
will occur at the conclusion of the prosecution’s case in chief and will end the defendant’s trial 
(at least for the moment) before the accused begins presenting his defense.  The appellate 
proceedings therefore can be viewed, in effect, as a substitute for the remainder of the 
defendant’s trial.  During the pendency of the appeal, the accused will not have to face the 
stress, embarrassment, and expense of the remainder of his trial.  And while he still must 
“defend” himself in the appellate court, doing so under these circumstances may be less stressful 
and embarrassing than defending himself at trial,272 in large part because the trial judge has 
already decided to rule in his favor after concluding the prosecution did not prove its case.273  
On the other hand, the appellate process almost certainly will last longer than it would have 
taken to complete the defendant’s trial,274 so whatever stress and embarrassment the appellate 
process does produce will last longer than that which would have resulted from the completion 
of the defendant’s trial.275  In addition, the appeal may be more expensive for a non-indigent 
                                                 
272  Cf. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) (“This limited appeal [by the prosecution 
of a convicted defendant’s sentence] does not involve a retrial or approximate the ordeal of a trial on the basic issue 
of guilt or innocence.  Under [the applicable statute], the appeal is to be taken promptly and is essentially on the 
record of the sentencing court.”). 
273  The defendant will of course be worried about having to undergo a new trial, or the resumption of his 
original trial, and his life may be put on “hold” during the pendency of the appellate process.  Those concerns were 
discussed earlier.  See supra text accompanying notes 230-54. 
274  As previously noted, some defendants in England have had to wait over six months for the Court of 
Appeal to decide the prosecution’s appeal.  See supra note 271.  Even if it took the appellate court only a few days 
to decide an appeal by the prosecution, see infra note 275, that period is still likely to exceed the time it would have 
taken for the defendant to have presented his case in the trial court, for rebuttal by the prosecution, and for the jury to 
have reached its verdict.  
275  One way to limit the stress and embarrassment during the pendency of the prosecution’s appeal would 
be to expedite all such appeals and, with perhaps some exceptions, such as for death penalty cases, give them 
priority over other appeals pending in the appellate court.  Given the limited issue involved, an appellate court could 
decide such an appeal in a very short period of time.  E.g., R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [1], [15] (Eng.) 
(the trial judge ruled on Dec. 4, 2006, that the defendant had no case to answer, and the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the prosecution’s appeal four days later, on Dec. 8, 2006). 
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defendant than would the completion of the trial.276  On balance, then, one might reasonably 
conclude that the distress and trauma, and perhaps also the financial cost, of the appellate 
process that has replaced that which would have resulted had the trial judge denied the 
defendant’s motion for a court-ordered acquittal and allowed the trial to continue until the jury 
reached a verdict will to some extent increase the overall stress and anxiety caused by the 
criminal process.277 
                                                 
276  See supra note 269. 
277  See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.13 (“If, in fact, there were no 
mistake, and, ultimately, an appeal court were to find the original verdict of acquittal sound, then the accused has 
faced an unnecessary emotional and financial burden.”). 
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Moreover, if the appellate court disagrees with the trial judge and orders a new trial, the 
defendant will suffer the anxiety, embarrassment, and perhaps expense of a second trial for the 
same offense,278 thus frustrating one of the major purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  It is 
true, of course, that the double jeopardy provision does not in all circumstances bar a second trial 
for the same offense.  A second trial for the same offense is permissible, for example, when the 
trial judge in the defendant’s first trial declares a mistrial,279 either at the request of the defendant 
or with his consent,280 or, regardless of the defendant’s consent, because of the jury’s inability to 
reach a verdict281 or some other valid reason.282  In each of these situations, though, the 
                                                 
278  Alternatively, the appellate court might order the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial, see 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(a) (Eng.), which would also cause the defendant additional anxiety, 
embarrassment, and perhaps expense. 
279  A new trial also is permissible, in most circumstances, when a convicted defendant successfully 
appeals his conviction.  United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896).  Accord Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 
33, 38-39 (1988); Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1970); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465-66 
(1971) (articulating the rationale for allowing a second trial).  But see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) 
(holding the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial when a defendant’s conviction is reversed by a reviewing 
court solely for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction).  The justification for allowing retrial in this 
situation and the reasons for distinguishing the situation involving a prosecution appeal of a trial judge’s decision to 
direct a verdict of not guilty are discussed infra text accompanying notes 320-21. 
280  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, (1982) (holding a retrial is constitutionally permissible following a 
mistrial declared at the request of the defendant, except when the prosecution engaged in conduct “intended to 
‘goad’ the defendant into moving for [the] mistrial”); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08, 611 (1976) 
(holding a retrial is permissible following a mistrial declared at the request of the defendant or with his consent, even 
if his request were necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial error). 
281  United States v. Perez,  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (holding a retrial is constitutionally 
permissible following a mistrial brought about by a deadlocked jury).  Accord Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. ___, 
___ (2012), 2012 WL 1868066, at *7  (May 24, 2012) (“[T]he trial court’s reason for declaring a mistrial here–that 
the jury was unable to reach a verdict–has long been considered the ‘classic basis’ establishing . . .a [manifest] 
necessity [to declare a mistrial without barring a subsequent trial].”). 
282  Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580 (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial when a 
trial judge, without the defendant’s consent, declares a mistrial because “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or 
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”).  Accord Blueford, 132 S. Ct. at ___, 2012 WL 1868066, at 
*7  (May 24, 2012) (“”[A] trial can be discontinued without barring a subsequent one for the same offense when 
‘particular circumstances manifest a necessity’ to declare a mistrial.” (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 
(1949))); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 516 (1978) (holding a retrial is constitutionally permissible 
following a mistrial brought about by a “manifest necessity”). 
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defendant’s trial ended without a decision–the defendant was neither convicted nor 
acquitted–and it can be persuasively argued that the interests of justice require the defendant 
undergo a second trial for the same offense so the question of his guilt or innocence can be 
resolved one way or the other.283  In addition, when the defendant moved for a mistrial, or 
consented to one, it is by no means unfair to allow him to be tried anew for the same offense, for 
he himself sought to end his trial, or at least consented to have his trial end, before the fact finder 
reached a decision on his guilt or innocence.284  Indeed, in seeking, or agreeing, to have the jury 
discharged because error infected the trial, the defendant most likely contemplated he would be 
subject to a new trial.285 
                                                 
283  See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing the public has an “interest . . . in 
seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of acquittal or conviction”). 
With respect to the situation involving a hung jury, there are additional considerations.  If a jury verdict, 
whether a conviction or acquittal, requires unanimity, as in federal criminal trials, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404, 369 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in 
federal criminal trial); id. at 414-15 (1972) (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (concluding 
the Sixth Amendment, as applicable to the states requires a unanimous verdict in both state and federal criminal 
trials); id. at 388, 394 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (same), and most states, see 6 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 99, § 22.1(e), or in some circumstances the agreement of a specified number, such as ten 
members of a twelve-person jury, LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“A case in which punishment is necessarily confinement 
at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.”); OR. 
CONST. art. I, § 11 (“[I]n the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save 
and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict . . . .”); see 
also P.R. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“In all prosecutions for a felony the accused shall have the right of trial by an 
impartial jury composed of twelve residents of the district, who may render their verdict by a majority vote which in 
no case may be less than nine.”), precluding retrial when the jury cannot meet the requirements for a verdict, for 
example, when it is split 9-3 in favor of conviction, or 8-4 in favor of acquittal, would actually change the 
requirements for a verdict of not guilty to provide, in effect, that a jury reaches a verdict of not guilty whenever a 
sufficient number do not agree to convict.  While some may prefer such a rule, it has never been the law in 
Anglo-American legal systems.  Moreover, although “fault” can sometimes be attributed to one party or the other 
when a mistrial is declared before the case is sent to the jury–in the sense that the prosecutor or defense counsel 
engaged in some (mis)conduct that gave rise to the request for a mistrial (or to the judge’s sua sponte declaration of 
a mistrial)–neither party can be “faulted” for the jury’s inability to reach a verdict. 
284  See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607-08 (1976). 
285  See id. at 608. 
The trial court, in granting the mistrial, most certainly also anticipated the defendant would be retried.  
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (“When a trial court declares a mistrial, it all but invariably 
contemplates that the prosecutor will be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant’s plea of double 
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The above reasoning does not apply, however, when a trial judge erroneously ends a 
defendant’s trial by ruling the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish a prima facie case of 
guilt.  First, unlike the situation involving the declaration of a mistrial, when a trial judge 
concludes the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient, there is (or at least will be) a decision in the 
case–the trial judge has concluded the prosecution failed to prove its case and the defendant 
should be acquitted.  If retrial is barred, the charge against the defendant will not stand 
unresolved.  Second, although the defendant moved for a court-ordered acquittal, and in that 
sense is “responsible” for the trial judge’s ruling, the defendant–unlike in the situation in which 
he asks for or consents to a mistrial because of some error in the proceedings–sought to end the 
trial with a decision on his guilt or innocence.286  He did not desire a new trial, nor did he 
contemplate one would take place if the judge granted his motion; rather he wanted the case to 
end then and there with his acquittal, and thought that if the judge granted his motion it would do 
so. 
That the trial judge might have “erred” in ruling the defendant was entitled to a directed 
verdict of not guilty287 is not the defendant’s fault.  So why should he have to “pay” for it by 
                                                 
286  Compare Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (“[T]he defendant elected to seek termination of the trial on grounds 
unrelated to guilt or innocence.  This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant 
who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first 
trier of fact.” (emphasis added)); id. at 98-99 (“[T]he defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the 
proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, 
suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the [g]overnment is permitted to appeal from such 
a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant.” (emphasis added)). 
287  The word “erred” is enclosed in quotation marks because a ruling by a trial judge is deemed to be 
erroneous whenever the majority of an appellate court disagrees with her decision.  In fact, the ruling may not be an 
“error” at all.  For it is quite conceivable (as illustrated by the numerous cases in which a supreme court has 
reversed the decision of an appellate court that disagreed with a ruling of the trial judge) the trial judge–not the 
appellate court–reached the “correct” result.  See ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 
15, para. 3.19 n.21 (acknowledging that “appellate courts . . . can make mistakes”).  However, because the appellate 




undergoing a new trial?288  Although a trial judge in a common law system plays a neutral role 
in the trial, he “is more closely allied with the government than with the accused,”289 and is 
employed and paid by the state.  Why should that same state, as represented by the prosecution, 
be entitled to drag an individual into court a second time and require him to undergo the ordeal 
of a second trial because one of its own actors made a mistake?  As one judge put it, “[i]f the 
[trial] judge makes a mistake and the accused is acquitted, then the setting aside of the verdict 
may involve the accused in the emotional ordeal of going through it all again, although the 
mistake was something over which he had no control.”290 
One therefore must conclude that a statute or rule of court allowing the prosecution to 
appeal a trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal, and to try the defendant again for the same 
offense if the appeal succeeds, frustrates the Double Jeopardy Clause’s purpose of limiting the 
ordeal of the trial process to that arising from a single trial. 
                                                 
288  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para.2.13. 
289  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 298. 
290  R v Jessop, [1974] Tas SR 64, 87 (Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Chambers, J., dissenting). 
3.  Reducing the Risk of an Erroneous Conviction 
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Prohibiting the government from prosecuting an acquitted individual a second time for 
the same offense prevents the government from attempting to persuade a second fact finder of 
the individual’s guilt “after having failed with the first”291 and thereby reduces the risk of 
erroneously convicting an innocent person.292  As the Supreme Court recognized in Green v. 
United States,293 if the government were allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an offense, it would “enhanc[e] the possibility that even though innocent he may 
be found guilty.”294  The risk of an erroneous conviction would increase for a number of 
reasons.  First, if an innocent person accused of a crime could face additional trials for the same 
offense, even after being acquitted, he might decide to dispense with a trial and plead guilty to 
the charge against him.295  Second, and more importantly, permitting a second trial for the same 
offense, despite an acquittal, would allow the government to use the first trial as a “dress 
rehearsal,”296 giving it the opportunity to “hon[e] its trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence”297 
in light of what it learned at the first trial about the weaknesses of its case298 and the strengths299 
                                                 
291  United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
292  According to Professor Martin L. Friedland, the increased chances of convicting an innocent person at 
a second trial for the same offense “is at the core of the problem.”   FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4.  
293  355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
294  Id. at 188.  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.5; 
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 20, at 2. 
295  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4. 
296  United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 749 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part).  See also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990) (“Multiple prosecutions . . . give the State 
an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof.”), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
297  Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982). 
298  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). 
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and weaknesses of the defendant’s case.300  With that knowledge, the government could, for 
example, “‘supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.’”301  Third, if the 
government could repeatedly prosecute an individual for the same offense, it could, with its 
vastly superior resources,302 wear down the defendant–financially,303 emotionally,304 and  
                                                                                                                                                             
299  DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128. 
300  Professor Friedland writes that at a second trial the defendant 
may be at a greater disadvantage than he was at the first trial because he will 
normally have disclosed his complete defence at the former trial.  Moreover, he 
may have entered the witness-box himself.  The prosecutor can study the 
transcript and may thereby find apparent defects and inconsistencies in the 
defence evidence to use at the second trial. 
FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4.  See also ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 
4.5 (“[B]ecause there has already been one trial at which the defence has shown its hand, the prosecution may enjoy 
a tactical advantage at a second trial; and this will increase the likelihood of a conviction, whether the defendant is 
guilty or innocent.”); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 7.65 (“[A]t a retrial witnesses will 
have had a dry run, tactics will have been revealed and weaknesses in the prosecution case will have been spotted 
and possibly plugged.”).  Cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.14 (1978) (quoting Judge Leventhal’s 
description in Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (concurring opinion), of how some of 
the Government’s witnesses subtly changed their testimony over the course of four trials so it became more 
favorable to the Government); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (in a prosecution for robbing a 
participant in a poker game, following the defendant’s acquittal of robbing another participant in the same poker 
game, the State conceded that when the prosecutor lost the first trial, “‘he did what every good attorney would do–he 
refined his presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial’”); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465-66 
(1958) (in a prosecution for robbing a person at a tavern, following the defendant’s acquittal of robbing three other 
individuals at the tavern in the same incident, the State altered its presentation of proof by calling only the witness 
who had testified most favorably to it in the first trial). 
It is true that in a second trial for the same offense “the defence may equally be in a position to adapt their 
case to the prosecution strategy appropriately.”  Dennis, supra note 104, at 939. The defendant’s resources, 
however, pale in comparison to those of the government, see infra note 302, and the defendant might be financially, 
emotionally, and physically worn out after the first trial.  See infra text accompanying notes 303-05.  The defendant 
might therefore decide to plead guilty before the retrial because of his inability to undergo the burden of a second 
trial.  Cf. text accompanying note 294.  Even if he opts to undergo a second trial, any knowledge of the 
government’s evidence and its strategy he may have gained at the first trial is likely to be of less value to him than 
the information gained by the government at the first trial.  For example, if the government discovered a particular 
weakness in its own case, it is likely that it could do much more to eliminate that weakness (e.g., locate and 
interview witnesses or conduct forensic tests) than the defendant, with his limited resources, could do if he identified 
a particular weakness in his own case.  Moreover, the fact that the defendant gained information about the 
government’s evidence or strategy does nothing to prevent a jury from convicting him “contrary to the evidence” at 
his second trial.  See infra text accompanying notes 307-08. 
301  Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 11 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)). 
302  The government possesses an enormous advantage in resources over those of an individual accused of 
crime, typically allowing it to do much more in its efforts to convict the individual than the individual can do in his 
defense.  For example, if the prosecution knows a particular person’s testimony would be favorable to it, but does 
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physically305–and obtain a conviction “through sheer governmental perseverance.”306  Finally, if 
it is accepted that juries do sometimes return a guilty verdict “contrary to the evidence,”307 “the 
chance that a particular defendant will be perversely convicted must increase if he is tried more 
than once.”308  In sum, as Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus so eloquently put 
it, “[i]f you play with something long enough, you are likely to break it; and if the government is 
allowed to prosecute an innocent defendant enough times and disregard all acquittals, eventually 
it is likely to convict an innocent (by hypothesis) person.”309 
                                                                                                                                                             
not know the person’s whereabouts, it can spend huge sums of money to track down the missing witness, perhaps 
even using the police department to help it.  Moreover, not only can the prosecution assign numerous staff attorneys 
to prepare and present its case, it also can use doctors, scientists, and other forensic experts on the government 
payroll (or it can hire such individuals on a case-by-case basis) to help in the investigation, preparation, and 
presentation of its case.  In sum, the prosecution can spend “whatever it takes” in a particular case to obtain a 
conviction.  On the other hand, it is unlikely that all but the wealthiest criminal defendants could afford to retain an 
attorney and then match, or even come close to matching, the government’s spending to allow the attorney to 
investigate the facts in the case and to prepare for trial.  Nor is it likely that a court-appointed attorney would be 
permitted to expend substantial sums from the public coffers for such purposes. 
303  See supra text accompanying notes 257-60. 
304  See supra text accompanying note 262, 
305  See supra text accompanying note 263. 
306  Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41.  See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4 (“In many cases an innocent person 
will not have the stamina or resources effectively to fight a second charge.”). 
307   BLACK’S, supra note 16, at 1697 (defining a “perverse verdict” as “[a] verdict so contrary to the 
evidence that it justifies the granting of a new trial”). 
308  ENG.  LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.5 (footnote omitted) 
(defining a “perverse verdict of guilty” as “a guilty verdict where there was nothing in the trial process, save the 
result, that could raise a ground of appeal–a case which would fall only into the category formerly described as 
‘lurking doubt’ cases”). 
309  Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
31 n.158 (1995).  See also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 278 n.74 (1965) (attempting to illustrate 
the point through a mathematical equation). 
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A statute or rule of court allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s decision to 
direct a verdict of not guilty will frustrate this purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.310  
Whenever the prosecution, acting in good faith, brings an individual to trial on a criminal charge, 
it believes it has sufficient evidence to prove the individual’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.311 
 In trials that run their course, the prosecution may learn its belief was wrong when the jury 
acquits the defendant, but at that point the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the prosecution 
from strengthening its case and bringing a second prosecution against the acquitted individual 
for the same offense.  When, however, a trial judge decides at the close of the prosecution’s case 
in chief that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt, the 
prosecution learns at an earlier time that its evidence may not be as strong as it initially believed. 
 Yet, allowing the prosecution to appeal the trial judge’s ruling may result in the prosecution’s 
being able to retry the “acquitted” defendant for the same offense.312  And certainly if it 
succeeds in its appeal and obtains a new trial, it will not merely present the same evidence that 
initially resulted in the trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal.313  For even if the appellate 
                                                 
310  See N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.6 (“[T]he ultimate consequence 
of allowing an appeal from a directed verdict of acquittal may be a retrial.  The accused’s position in that event is 
unlikely to be exactly the same as it was at the original trial, and, in fact, more likely to be prejudiced in comparison 
with the earlier position.”); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial Accountability: When is an Acquittal 
Not an Acquittal?, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 977 (1995) (“Th[e] risk [that the prosecution will convict an innocent 
defendant] is most acute when either the court or the jury has assessed the prosecution’s case and found it 
wanting.”). 
311  See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9 (“A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be 
instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to 
support a conviction.”). 
312  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
313  The only exception might be when the appellate court reverses the trial judge’s ruling because the trial 
judge based her ruling on the absence of any evidence of what the trial judge concluded constituted a required 
element of the offense, see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 1.8(1) (“The prosecution may have proved all of the required 
elements of the crime except one, but a lack of proof concerning one element requires a directed verdict.”), but 
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court were correct and the prosecution did present a prima facie case of guilt, the prosecution 
will have been put on notice that, at least in the eyes of a trained, professional judge, its case 
against the defendant was not a particularly strong one, and it “presumably will be spurred to 
greater efforts in gathering and presenting proof of guilt”314 at the defendant’s second trial.  
Moreover, if the trial judge gave a detailed explanation of her reasons for finding the 
prosecution’s case insufficient, the prosecution will have a road map marking the areas in which 
it needs to strengthen its case at the retrial.315  For example, it may try to strengthen its case 
against the defendant by presenting additional evidence on a particular factual issue;316 or it may 
work with a witness so the witness comes across more credibly while testifying at the second 
trial than he did at the first trial; or perhaps it will refrain from calling a particular witness whose 
testimony at the first trial was confused or somewhat contradictory.317  In effect, it will treat the 
first, aborted, trial as a “dry run”318 for the second trial.  And the prosecution will gain an 
advantage over the defendant even though the defendant did not put on his case at the first trial.  
As the English Law Commission explained, 
                                                                                                                                                             
which the appellate court found was not a required element. 
If the appellate court orders the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial, see id. § 61(4) (a), rather than a 
new trial, the prosecution may well seek to reopen its case to present additional evidence when the trial is resumed. 
314  Poulin, supra note 310, at 977. 
315  Professor Poulin concludes that, “if it is accompanied by a statement of reasons, a judicial 
determination of inadequacy will be a more effective spur to the prosecution [to correct the deficiency in its case] 
than [would] a general verdict of not guilty.”  Id. 
316  Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1970) (at the defendant’s trial for the armed robbery of a 
participant in a poker game, following the defendant’s acquittal of armed robbery of another participant, the 
prosecution elicited stronger identification testimony from three of the witnesses who had testified at the defendant’s 
first trial and declined to call the robbery victim whose identification testimony at the first trial had been negative). 
317  Cf. id.; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1958). 
318  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445. 
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the defence may have tested [the prosecution’s evidence] in cross-examination.  
In doing so the defence may have revealed some or all of its strategy, although it 
will not have begun to present its case.  It may also have provided the 
prosecution witnesses who have given evidence with a ‘dry run’.  Accordingly, 
in these ways the defence would be disadvantaged at a retrial by facing a 
prosecution potentially better prepared.319 
 
                                                 
319  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 15, para. 6.3 (stating, however, that, 
“[c]onversely, the defence will have available for cross-examination on the retrial an additional version of events 
from prosecution witnesses on the basis of which it may be able to mount a challenge to witnesses’ reliability, based 
on inconsistencies in their various accounts”). 
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It is true of course that retrials are a routine feature of the criminal justice system in the 
United States, occurring most frequently after a convicted defendant successfully appeals his 
conviction, or after the trial judge declares a mistrial in the defendant’s initial trial, either 
because the jury could not reach a verdict or because of an error that infected the trial.  Retrials 
are permitted in these situations even though the prosecution is likely to have an additional 
advantage over the defendant at the second trial.320  Consequently, it could be argued that the 
prosecution’s ability to strengthen its case at a retrial following the prosecutions’s successful 
appeal of a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal ruling should not be a reason for barring the 
prosecution from taking such appeals.  This reasoning is flawed, however.  Merely because the 
legal system sometimes allows the prosecution to enjoy an additional advantage over the 
defendant at a retrial does not mean it should always permit it to do so.  One must remember 
that the prosecution’s ability to strengthen its case at a retrial raises a concern because it 
increases the possibility that an innocent person will be convicted.  Furthermore, each of the 
                                                 
320  See supra notes 76, 129 & 279, and text accompanying notes 279-82. 
The extent of the additional advantage may depend upon the stage at which the defendant’s first trial ended. 
 The prosecution is likely to have learned very little about the defense case, or any weaknesses in its own case, when 
the first trial ended before the prosecution began presenting its evidence, such as during the prosecutor’s opening 
statement.  As a general matter, though, it is likely that the prosecution will have learned significantly more about 
the defense strategy and evidence, and perhaps about any weaknesses in its own case, when the trial judge aborted 
the initial trial during, or immediately following the completion of, the prosecution’s case.  For even when the trial 
was halted before the defense presented its case, the prosecution may have learned something about the defendant’s 
strategy.  See supra text accompanying note 319.  Of course, it is likely the prosecution will have gained the most 
if the defendant’s first trial ran its course, that is, after both the prosecution and the defense fully presented their 
cases, as in the situations of a hung jury or a successful defense appeal of a conviction. 
Even if the appellate court  merely ordered the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial upon finding the 
trial judge erred in concluding the prosecution did not establish a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt, and the 
prosecution were not allowed to reopen its case upon the resumption of the trial, it could still, if the defendant 
presents a case, attempt to strengthen its attack on certain aspects of the defendant’s case and attempt to strengthen 
its own case in its rebuttal.  Moreover, given the practicalities of the situation, it will be a rare case in which the 
defendant’s original trial can be resumed.  For the appellate process in most jurisdictions in the United States takes 
time, and it would be difficult to keep the jury empanelled during the time it would take for the appellate court to 
decide the prosecution’s appeal. 
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situations mentioned above in which retrials are common is distinguishable from the situation in 
which a retrial follows the reversal of a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal ruling. 
When a convicted defendant appeals his conviction on the ground that error infected his 
trial, he is the one asking that the case against him not end with the judgment entered upon the 
jury’s verdict of guilty, and at the time he appeals, it would seem he would be quite content if the 
appellate court overturned his conviction and granted him a new trial, even though the 
prosecution might have an additional advantage at a second trial.  That certainly is not the case 
when the prosecution appeals a trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal.  Should the appellate 
court disagree with the trial judge and remand the case for a new trial, or the resumption of the 
initial trial, the defendant will be forced to surrender a decision favorable to him (i.e., an 
acquittal ruling), and one that, absent the appeal, would have forever ended the case against him 
for that offense;321 in addition, he may be forced to undergo a second trial at which he is likely to 
be at an additional disadvantage.  In short, while it may not be unfair to retry a convicted 
defendant who seeks to overturn his conviction and obtain a new trial, it may well be unfair to 
compel a defendant who has benefitted from the trial judge’s ruling ordering an acquittal to give 
up that favorable ruling and undergo a new trial. 
                                                 
321  See supra text accompanying notes 71-74 & 80-86. 
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As explained earlier, when a jury, after hearing all the evidence in the case, cannot reach 
a verdict, there is no decision in the case.322  Moreover, neither party can be blamed for the 
jury’s inability to reach a decision.  Under such circumstances, the interests of justice require a 
second trial for the same offense so the charges against the defendant can be resolved.323  
Prohibiting a retrial in such situations would frustrate the public interest in resolving the charges 
against the accused,324 and in effect, would eliminate the requirement that a prescribed number 
of jurors agree upon a “not guilty” verdict for a defendant to be acquitted.325  Unlike the case of 
a hung jury, however, when a trial judge decides to order an acquittal there will be (absent a right 
of appeal) a decision in the case–the trial judge has concluded the prosecution failed to meet its 
burden of proof and the defendant therefore should be acquitted.  Furthermore, even if the trial 
judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof, that error can be 
attributed to an agent of the state–the trial judge.326  Clearly, the error was not the defendant’s 
fault, and he should not have to “pay” for it by being forced to undergo a new trial.327 
Finally, the declaration of a mistrial during the defendant’s initial trial because of some 
error that infected the trial–like the situation involving a deadlocked jury, but unlike the situation 
                                                 
322  See supra text accompanying notes 281 & 283. 
323  See United States v. Perez,  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (holding a retrial is constitutionally 
permissible following a mistrial brought about by a deadlocked jury).  See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 
497, 509 (1978). 
324  See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing that the public has an “interest . . . in 
seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of acquittal or conviction”). 
325  See supra note 283. 
326  See supra text accompanying note 289. 
327  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.13. 
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involving a trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal–ends that trial without a determination of 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  It therefore can again be argued that the interests of justice 
require the case against the defendant be resolved one way or the other.328  Moreover, when the 
trial judge declares a mistrial at the request of the defendant, or with his consent, the defendant 
in nearly all circumstances contemplates being tried again for the same offense.329  Indeed, in 
most situations in which the defendant moves for a mistrial, he wants a retrial because he thinks 
the error that gave rise to his motion would increase the chances of his being convicted at the 
first trial and would in any event necessitate a retrial following a successful appeal.330  This is 
not true when a defendant moves for a directed verdict of not guilty or its equivalent.  A 
defendant who files such a motion seeks to end the trial with a decision on his guilt or 
innocence.331 
                                                 
328  See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing that the public has an “interest . . . in 
seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of acquittal or conviction”). 
329  See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976). 
The trial court in granting the mistrial most certainly also contemplated that the defendant would be retried. 
 United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (“When a trial court declares a mistrial, it all but invariably 
contemplates that the prosecutor will be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant’s plea of double 
jeopardy.”). 
330  See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, 610. 
331  Compare Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (“[T]he defendant elected to seek termination of the trial on grounds 
unrelated to guilt or innocence.  This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant 
who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first 
trier of fact.” (emphasis added)); id. at 98-99 (“[T]he defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the 
proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, 
suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the [g]overnment is permitted to appeal from such 
a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant.” (emphasis added)). 
Thus, although retrials in criminal cases occur with some frequency in the United States, 
such retrials should be limited to those situations in which a convicted defendant successfully 
appeals his conviction or those in which there was no decision in the case, either because of a 
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“hung” jury or the declaration of a mistrial based upon trial error.  Such a limitation will keep to 
a minimum the number of cases in which the additional advantages enjoyed by the prosecution at 
a retrial could lead to the conviction of an innocent person. 
 
4.  Protecting the Power of the Jury to Acquit Against the Evidence 
Another purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause identified by the Supreme Court is to 
protect the prerogative of the jury, acting “as the conscience of the community in applying the 
law,”332 “to acquit against the evidence,”333 that is, to find the defendant not guilty “even when 
its findings as to the facts, if literally applied to the law as stated by the judge, would have 
resulted in a conviction.”334  A jury may exercise this power to “nullify” the law in a particular 
case for one of a variety of reasons,335 such as its belief that the conduct in question should not 
be a crime,336 or its feeling that the punishment for the crime in question is too severe.337 
                                                 
332  Westen & Drubel, supra note 97, at 130. 
333  United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 n.11 (1980) (quoting Westen, supra note 98, at 1063) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
334  6 LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 99, § 22.1(g). 
According to Professor Peter Westen and Richard Drubel this is the primary purpose behind the rule against 
double jeopardy.  Westen & Drubel, supra note 97, at 84. 
335  See generally CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE (1998); 6 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 99, § 22.1(g). 
336  For instance, a jury might be unwilling to convict an individual of murder when, at the request of a 
terminally-ill spouse, relative, friend, or patient, he intentionally killed that person.  See, e.g., Three Acquitted of 
Mercy Killing, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN (Austl.), Oct. 24, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 WLNR 5392278 (reporting 
the acquittal by a jury of a doctor who used a lethal injection to kill a terminally-ill patient hours after the patient 
begged another doctor to end her suffering).  Or , a jury might acquit a battered wife of murder for intentionally 
killing her abusive husband despite several days having passed since he last beat her, thereby eliminating any valid 
self-defense claim).  See Melissa Jenkins, Sniper Mother Walks Free–Murder Acquittal Sets New Defence for 
Battered Wives, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Mar. 4, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 3677321 (reporting a 
jury found a battered woman who laid in wait before shooting her husband to death not guilty of either murder or 
manslaughter).  See also CONRAD, supra note 335, at 151-52. 
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337  CONRAD, supra note 335, at 147-49.  See also KALVEN.& ZEISEL, supra note 28, at 306-12. 
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Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling allowing a motion for a 
directed verdict of not guilty does not frustrate this policy.  For such a ruling ends the case, at 
least temporarily, in the defendant’s favor before the jury has even had an opportunity to 
consider the evidence and decide whether to exercise its power to nullify the law and acquit the 
defendant despite its finding the defendant committed the crime in question.  Moreover, 
although a defendant possesses a “‘valued right to have his trial completed by a particular 
tribunal’”338–one “he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate’”339–by moving for a 
court-ordered acquittal,340 he has asked the trial judge to end the case before the particular jury 
                                                 
338  Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.684, 689 (1949)). 
339  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 
(1971) (plurality opinion)). 
This right has particular significance in the context of mistrials.  After the start of a trial, the prosecution 
might, for a variety of reasons, find the case “going badly,” Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 369 (1961), for it.  
Rather than continue the trial to what it believes would likely be an acquittal, the prosecution might prefer to have 
“another, more favorable opportunity to convict the accused,” id., by starting the trial anew.  Doing so, however, 
would “depriv[e] the defendant of his option to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with 
an acquittal.”  Jorn, 400 U.S. at 484 (plurality opinion).  Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a 
retrial if the trial judge declares a mistrial, either sua sponte or at the request of the prosecution, without the 
defendant’s consent, see, e.g., United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486-87 (1971) (plurality opinion) (concluding the 
double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial to allow 
several government witnesses the opportunity to consult with attorneys about their privilege against 
self-incrimination); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963) (holding the double jeopardy provision 
prohibited retrial following the trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor’s request and over the 
defendant’s objection, because of the absence of a key government witness); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 
667, (1982) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial following a mistrial declared at the request of the 
defendant when the prosecution engaged in conduct “intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for [the] 
mistrial”), and in the absence of a “manifest necessity.”  United States v. Perez,  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 
(1824) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial when a trial judge, without the defendant’s 
consent, declares a mistrial because “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would 
otherwise be defeated”).  Accord Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. ___, ___ (2012), 2012 WL 1868066, at *7  (May 
24, 2012) (“”[A] trial can be discontinued without barring a subsequent one for the same offense when ‘particular 
circumstances manifest a necessity’ to declare a mistrial.” (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949))).   
See also Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862-64 (2010) (discussing “[t]he ‘clearly established Federal law’ in this 
area” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006))); Washington, 434 U.S. at 505-17 (discussing the meaning of 
“manifest necessity”). 
340  It is of course possible for the trial judge, on her own motion, to decide to order an acquittal.  1 
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reached a verdict.  By doing so, he has shown his preference that the case end then and there, 
and deliberately elected “to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined”341 
by the jury hearing the case.342  In other words, by filing his motion for a directed verdict of not 
guilty he voluntarily gave up any opportunity he may have had for the jury to acquit him against 
the evidence.  If he believed the jury would have acquitted him regardless of the evidence of his 
guilt, he could have refrained from moving for a directed verdict and allowed the case to run its 
course.  Having chosen instead to make such a motion, he cannot convincingly claim that 
allowing the prosecution to appeal the trial judge’s decision interfered with the policy of 
allowing the jury to acquit against the evidence.343 
                                                                                                                                                             
LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 1.8(i); e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (“After the government closes its evidence or after the 
close of all the evidence, . . . [t]he court may on its own consider whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a 
conviction.” (emphasis added)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West _2004) (“In a case tried before a jury, the court . . 
. on its own motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for 
decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory 
pleading if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on 
appeal.” (emphasis added)); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a) (“If, at the close of the evidence for the state or at the close of 
all the evidence in the cause, the court is of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction, it 
may . . . enter a judgment of acquittal.”); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a) (“The judge . . . on his own motion shall enter a 
finding of not guilty of the offense charged in an indictment or complaint or any part thereof after the evidence on 
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction on the charge.” 
(emphasis added)).  Such situations are rare, however. 
341  United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978). 
342  Cf. id. at 93-94 (“[A] motion by the defendant [for mistrial] is deemed to be a deliberate election on his 
part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.  ‘The important 
consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the 
course to be followed in the event of [prosecutorial or judicial] error.’” (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 
600, 609 (1976))). 
343  The argument that permitting the prosecution to appeal the trial judge’s decision to allow a motion for a 
directed verdict interferes with a policy of permitting acts of “judicial nullification,” i.e., allowing the trial judge to 
“acquit for reasons of personal conscience, irrespective of the defendant’s actual guilt,” Westen & Drubel, supra 
note 97, at 134, is unpersuasive.  A trial judge’s midtrial acquittal of a defendant in a jury trial is, for several 
reasons, unlikely to be one against the evidence.  First, judges, unlike most jurors, are professional actors in the 
criminal justice system and on a daily basis are asked to supervise trials and apply the law in a neutral manner.  
Consequently, they are likely to view it as their professional responsibility to follow the law, certainly more so than 
would individual members of the community who are thrust, perhaps unwillingly, into the role of a juror on a 




5.  Preventing the Government from Harassing an Individual 
                                                                                                                                                             
positions, a trial judge would most likely conclude that, unlike a jury, she would not be acting as a representative of 
the community, see, e.g., United State v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.) (stating, in a case 
involving an appointed judge, that “the judge is hardly the ‘voice of the community,’ even when he sits in the jury’s 
place”), if, despite sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt, she were to acquit him against the evidence by 
allowing a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.  Finally, a judge in a jury trial–even one elected by the voters 
in the community–would probably believe that any decision to nullify the law should be made by the true 
representatives of the community in the case–the jury–and would be reluctant to interfere by engaging in an act of 
“judicial nullification” under the guise of a directed verdict of not guilty.  Thus, because of only a slight possibility 
that a trial judge’s decision to allow a motion for a directed verdict actually constitutes an instance of “judicial 
nullification,” allowing the prosecution to appeal such a decision does not frustrate the policy of allowing “the 
judicial system to temper the legislature’s generalized standards of criminal responsibility with lenity in particular 
cases.”  Westen & Drubel, supra note 97, at 134. 
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The guarantee against double jeopardy also is intended “to prevent the harassment of the 
accused by repeated prosecution for the same matter.”344  Allowing the government to prosecute 
an individual for the same offense following his acquittal would grant it a power that “could be 
used illegitimately by ill-intentioned state servants.”345  In the absence of a rule against double 
jeopardy, it is possible that “the police, unhappy at [an individual’s] being found not guilty, 
would unfairly pursue the person in order to try to bring about a second trial,”346 or that a 
“disgruntled prosecutor”347 who believed a fact finder wrongly acquitted a guilty person could 
harass and oppress that person by prosecuting him a second time for the same offense, or by 
continuing to investigate him for the same offense, hoping to find additional evidence of his 
                                                 
344  NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70: ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION OF THE COURSE 
OF JUSTICE para. 12 (2001) [hereinafter N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70].  See also N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, 
REPORT 77, supra note 259, para.2.8 (“The development of the principle [of double jeopardy] has gone beyond 
prohibiting multiple punishment for the same offence, to adopting practices to prevent undue prolongation of the 
criminal process.  To allow otherwise is to risk harassment of an accused, who is, after all presumed innocent.”). 
The New Zealand Law Commission, whose work product is cited in this and subsequent notes in this 
Article, is a body comprising no fewer than three, and no more than six, members, established by the New Zealand 
Parliament in 1985.  Law Commission Act 1985, § 9 (N.Z.).  Its members are appointed by the Governor-General 
on the recommendation of the Cabinet.  E-mail from Margaret Thompson, Special Projects Advisor, New Zealand 
Law Commission, to David S. Rudstein, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Feb. 14, 2007, 20:18 
CST) (on file with author).  The principal functions of the Commission are: 
(a)  To take and keep under review in a systematic way the law of New 
Zealand: 
(b)  To make recommendations for the reform and development of the 
law of New Zealand: 
(c)  To advise on the review of any aspect of the law of New Zealand 
conducted by any Government department or organisation ... and on proposals 
made as a result of the review: 
(d)  To advise the Minister of Justice and the responsible Minister on 
ways in which the law of New Zealand can be made as understandable and 
accessible as practicable. 
Law Commission Act 1985, § 5 (N.Z.). 
345  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.14 (emphasis deleted). 
346  SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 13, para. 19. 
347  Thompson v Mastertouch T.V. Service Pty. Ltd. (No. 3), (1978) 38 FLR 397, 408 (Fed. Ct. Austl.) 
(Deane, J., with Smithers & Riley, JJ., agreeing). 
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guilt.348  Even if the second trial again resulted in the defendant’s being found not guilty, or if 
the police and the prosecutor did not discover any additional evidence of the acquitted person’s 
guilt and did not prosecute him a second time for the same offense, they may be satisfied with 
having caused the person additional embarrassment, anxiety, and perhaps expense arising from 
the second trial or the continued investigation. 
                                                 
348  See SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 13, para. 19.  
See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 3-4 (“The main rationale of the rule against double jeopardy is that it prevents 
the unwarranted harassment of the accused by multiple prosecutions.”); AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, 
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 20, at 2 (one of the policies underlying the rule against double jeopardy is “the 
protection of citizens from harassment by the State. . . .”). 
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Without any safeguards, a statute or rule of court permitting the prosecution to appeal a 
trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of not guilty could open the door to government 
harassment of the seemingly-acquitted defendant.  An unscrupulous prosecutor, upset at the trial 
judge’s ruling and determined to harass the individual who would otherwise be acquitted of the 
offense in question, could appeal the trial judge’s ruling even though he realized the appeal had 
little chance succeeding.349  By doing so, the prosecutor would force the individual to continue 
to defend himself against a charge that a judge had already found to be unsubstantiated.  Even if 
the prosecutor failed to convince the appellate court that the trial judge erred, and the case ended 
at that point with the acquittal of the accused, the prosecutor would have compelled the accused 
to undergo the anxiety, distress, and perhaps expense of the appellate process.350  On the other 
hand, if the unscrupulous prosecutor succeeded in convincing the appellate court that the trial 
judge erred in ruling the prosecution had not established a prima facie case, the defendant might 
be compelled to undergo a second trial for the same offense.351   Even if the prosecutor failed to 
obtain a conviction at the second trial, he will have required the accused to undergo the “heavy 
personal strain”352 of further judicial proceedings in the matter, thereby frustrating the guarantee 
                                                 
349  Allowing the prosecution to appeal a court-ordered acquittal would not make it possible for the police 
to harass the seemingly-acquitted defendant by trying to find new evidence against him.  For any inculpatory 
evidence discovered by the police following the trial judge’s ruling would be of no value to the prosecution unless it 
succeeded in obtaining a new trial of the accused.  Moreover, because the only issue in the prosecution’s appeal 
would be whether the evidence already presented in the prosecution’s case in chief sufficed to prove the defendant’s 
guilt, any newly-discovered evidence could not enhance the prosecution’s chances of succeeding in its appeal.  
Thus, the fact that the prosecution was appealing a trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of not guilty would not 
give the police an incentive to continue their investigation of the accused.  Indeed, it would seem the police would 
not want to waste their time further investigating an individual whom a judge had already “acquitted.” 
350  See supra text accompanying notes 269-77. 
351  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
352  United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 
400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 
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against double jeopardy’s purpose of preventing the government from harassing an individual 
through repeated trials for the same offense. 
The appeal process authorized by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, however, includes a 
significant safeguard for individuals who benefit from a trial judge’s ruling that the prosecution 
failed to prove its case, and for that reason a statute or rule of court containing provisions similar 
to those in the Act is unlikely to open the door to government harassment.  Such a statute or rule 
of court would allow the prosecution to appeal a decision to order an acquittal only after 
obtaining leave to appeal from either the trial judge or the appellate court.353  It is unlikely that 
either the trial judge or the appellate court would grant such leave if she, or it, suspected the 
prosecution sought to appeal merely to harass the accused.354  Such an oversight provision 
would enhance the probability that the trial judge or the appellate court would weed out any 
appeals undertaken by the prosecution merely for the purpose of obtaining a second trial to 
harass the “acquitted” individual.  Such a provision would thus provide a significant protection 
for the accused against government harassment, because the prosecution could not appeal a 
court-ordered acquittal merely on its own initiative and without any judicial oversight. 
                                                 
353  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4). 
354  If the prosecution’s evidence were clearly insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt, and the 
prosecution sought to appeal the trial judge’s ruling merely to harass the defendant, it is almost certain that neither 
the trial judge nor the appellate court would allow leave to appeal.  Moreover, as stated earlier, see supra note 32, in 
deciding whether to allow leave to appeal, the appellate court and the trial judge could be required to “look rather 
more widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask[ing] [itself] whether an appeal has a realistic prospect of 
success, or some other test directed solely at the merits of the appeal.”  R v. A., [2009] EWCA 2186, [8], [2009] 1 
Crim. App. 21, at 283 (Eng.).  Appeals undertaken by the prosecution merely to harass the accused would be 
unlikely to meet this standard. 
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Moreover, because the prosecution would be required to seek leave to appeal from the 
trial judge either “immediately after the ruling against which [it] wants to appeal,”355 or, if it 
receives an adjournment “until the next business day”356 to consider whether to appeal,357 
following the adjournment358 and because the trial judge must decide whether to allow leave to 
appeal “on the day that the application for permission is made,”359 no significant time will 
intervene between the trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict, or enter a required finding of not 
guilty, and the denial of leave by the trial judge.  And although it may take a bit longer for the 
appellate court to consider and deny an application for leave to appeal, any harassment of the 
accused by the prosecution from merely seeking to leave to appeal will be relatively minor. 
Even if an unscrupulous prosecutor successfully disguised his intention to obtain a new 
trial merely to harass the “acquitted” individual and managed to obtain leave to appeal, a second 
trial could occur only if the appellate court found the trial judge erred in ruling the prosecution’s 
evidence failed to establish the defendant’s guilt.360  Unlike the situation in a legal system that 
did not recognize the rule against double jeopardy, a second trial could not be brought merely at 
the whim of the prosecution.  The existence of such oversight makes it probable that appeals 
filed by the prosecution merely to harass the “acquitted” individual would be weeded out and the 
                                                 
355  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(a) (Eng.). 
356  Id. 67.2(2)(b).  But see R v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [10]-[12] (Eng.) (holding the court has the 
power to grant a greater extension of time than “until the next business day”). 
357  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(4)(a)(ii) (Eng.). 
358  Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(b). 
359  Id. 67.5(4). 
360  And also its finding that the defendant could receive a “fair trial” if the court ordered his initial trial 
resumed or that a new trial take place.  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(5). 
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“acquitted” individual would not have to undergo a second trial for the same offense. 
It is true, of course, that the prosecution might not care if it succeeds in obtaining a 
second trial.  Rather, its motive may merely be to harass the individual by subjecting him to the 
anxiety and expense brought about by the appellate process.  However, even if the prosecution 
managed to obtain leave to appeal, the anxiety and expense of the appellate process is likely to 
be far less than the anxiety and expense the “acquitted” defendant would be forced to undergo at 
a second trial for the same offense.361 
 
6.  Conserving Scarce Prosecutorial and Judicial Resources 
Barring the government from trying an individual a second time for the same offense 
following his acquittal also helps to conserve scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources.  It 
prevents the prosecution from spending additional time, money, and effort investigating and 
prosecuting an acquitted individual for the same offense again and again until it achieves the 
desired result–a conviction.362  It also prevents prosecutors from tying up courtrooms, judges, 
and court personnel in successive attempts to obtain a conviction.363 
                                                 
361  See supra text accompanying notes 272-77. 
362  Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (the State of Missouri charged an individual with robbing 
each of six participants in a poker game, and after he was tried and acquitted of robbing one participant, the State 
tried him for robbing a second participant); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) (after an individual was tried 
and acquitted of robbing three people at a tavern, the State tried him for robbing a fourth person who had been 
robbed in the same incident).  See also Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (per curiam) (in separate indictments, 
the State charged an individual with murdering his wife and three children and tried and convicted him three separate 
times–first for the murder of his wife, then for the murder of one of his daughters, and finally for the murder of his 
son–until it obtained the sentence it wanted, the death penalty). 
363  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4. 
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A statute or rule of court allowing the prosecution to appeal a court-ordered acquittal 
frustrates this policy to some extent.  Absent a right to appeal, a trial judge’s decision to direct a 
verdict of not guilty would end the case then and there in favor of the accused, and would force 
the prosecution to move on to its next case without “imposing further on scarce financial and 
court resources.”364  In a legal system that permits the prosecution to appeal a court-ordered 
acquittal, a prosecutor who files an appeal will spend additional time, money, and effort on a 
case that has already been “decided.”  Given the limited resources generally available to the 
prosecution, this means that an appeal of a court-ordered acquittal will divert time and resources 
from cases that have not yet been tried.365  If the prosecution succeeds in its appeal and obtains a 
new trial,366 or is allowed to resume the initial trial,367 it will have to divert further resources 
from untried cases to undertake the prosecution at that new, or resumed, trial.368  The reduced 
amount of time, effort, and money spent on some of these untried cases could result in acquittals 
                                                 
364  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.28. 
365  In addition to, or perhaps instead of, diverting resources from untried case, the prosecution might divert 
resources from cases pending on appeal.  Some of these appeals might be by convicted defendants who are 
challenging their conviction or sentence, or both   Others may be by the prosecution and might involve either the 
claim that the sentence imposed upon a convicted defendant was too lenient, or a challenge to a ruling made by a 
trial judge, such as one excluding a confession made by a defendant, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 444-45 
(1966) (holding inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief incriminating statements obtained by the police from 
the defendant in the absence of certain procedural safeguards), or excluding crucial physical evidence.  E.g., Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief evidence obtained by law 
enforcement authorities in an unreasonable search or seizure).  The diversion of resources from appeals could result 
in the reversal of convictions or the affirmance of rulings excluding prosecution evidence, in cases in which the 
appellate court would otherwise have, or at least should have, affirmed the convictions or reversed the rulings 
excluding evidence, and this could ultimately result in dangerous criminals being acquitted and going free.  Such a 
diversion of resources also could result in the appellate court’s upholding unduly lenient sentences, or reducing the 
length of some sentences that should not have been reduced, leading to the release of convicted criminals into the 
community at an earlier date than they might otherwise have been released. 
366  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
367  See id. § 61(4)(a). 
368  It may also divert resources from pending appeals.  See supra note 365.   
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that would otherwise have been–or at least should have been–convictions, perhaps resulting in 
dangerous criminals going free.  Moreover, if the prosecution’s appeal fails,369 or if it succeeds 
in its appeal but the defendant is acquitted in his new, or resumed, trial, the prosecution’s 
diversion of its limited resources will have been for naught.370 
Allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of not guilty 
also diverts limited judicial resources.  Instead of dealing with pending appeals–some of which 
might involve incarcerated individuals convicted at trials infected with legal error and whose 
appeals ultimately will be granted–appellate court judges will be deciding appeals of 
court-ordered acquittals.  Similarly, when the appellate reverses a court-ordered acquittal and 
orders a new trial, or the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial, the trial court might have to 
delay other trials so it can conduct the retrial or resume the initial trial–other trials that could 
involve a guilty defendant who is free in the community on bail or an innocent person being held 
in custody awaiting trial. 
 
                                                 
369  The appeal would fail if the prosecution did not obtain leave to appeal, see Criminal Justice Act, 2003, 
§ 57(4), (8)-(9), or if the appellate court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling on the merits.  See id. § 66(1), 2(c).  It 
would also “fail” if appellate court reversed the trial judge’s ruling but nevertheless ordered the defendant’s acquittal 
because it concluded he could not receive a fair trial at either a new trial or the resumption of his initial trial.  See id. 
§ 61(4)(c), (5). 
370  Of course, it is impossible to determine the ramifications of the prosecution’s decision to spend its 
limited resources on appealing a court-ordered acquittal, rather than on untried cases or pending appeals.  But even 
if it were possible, it would still be difficult, if not impossible, to access whether the appeal, if successful, achieved 
an overall benefit for society.  To illustrate, assume the prosecution obtained one additional burglary conviction in a 
given time period because of its successful appeal of a trial judge’s court-ordered acquittal.  At first glance, one 
would conclude that society gained by the prosecution’s expenditure of resources to appeal the trial judge’s ruling.  
But would that be true if, during the same time period, the prosecution expended resources to appeal, unsuccessfully, 
three other court-ordered acquittals in prosecutions for various property offenses, and because of its expenditure of 
resources on the four appeals, diverted time, effort, and money from a rape trial that resulted in the defendant’s 
acquittal (and release into the community) that, with the infusion of more time, effort, and money, would otherwise 




7.  Maintaining the Public’s Respect for, and Confidence in, the Legal System 
As Professor Martin L. Friedland points out, the rule against double jeopardy protects 
“not just the accused,”371 but also “the legal system itself.”372 “By preventing harassment and 
inconsistent results,” he explains, “the rule assists in ensuring that court proceedings . . . 
‘command the respect and confidence of the public.’”373  The public would almost certainly lose 
respect for the legal system if the government were allowed to prosecute an individual again and 
again for the same offense, despite repeated acquittals.  In most cases, the public would perceive 
the multiple prosecutions as government harassment.374  Moreover, if the government ultimately 
obtained a conviction after a previous acquittal, the inconsistent verdicts could affect the public’s 
confidence in the accuracy of the legal system and dilute the moral force of the criminal law,375 
because it would “leave[] people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”376 
                                                 
371  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4. 
372  Id.  See also N.Z. LAW COMM’N., REPORT 70, supra note 344, para. 14 (“A consequence of the rule 
against double jeopardy is protection of the administration of justice itself.”). 
373  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4 (quoting Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 1353  (Lord 
Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)). 
374  See N.Z. LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 344, para. 14. 
375  Id. 
376  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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Members of the community also might view a right to appeal a court-ordered acquittal as 
a tool the government could use to dismantle what would otherwise be an acquittal, and they 
might ultimately conclude that the government is not always bound by an acquittal with which it 
disagrees and that citizens therefore are not adequately protected.  This would be especially true 
if significant numbers of court-ordered acquittals were overturned by the appellate court.  
Moreover, the more court-ordered acquittals the appellate courts reverse, the more likely the 
public will question the legal ability of its trial judges.  Perhaps more importantly, many may 
ask: If trial judges keep getting it “wrong” in the important matter of whether the prosecution’s 
evidence is sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, are they likely to 
be getting it “right” on other “less important” issues arising in a trial, such as evidentiary rulings, 
that could ultimately lead to the conviction of innocent individuals or the acquittal of guilty 
people?  Questions could also arise about the legal ability of the appellate court judges if cases 
in which they reverse a court-ordered acquittal and order a new,377 or resumed,378 trial ultimately 
result in the jury’s finding the defendant not guilty.379 
                                                 
377  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.). 
378  See id. § 61(4)(a). 
379  In fact, no inconsistency necessarily exists between a finding that the prosecution presented sufficient 
evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt and a jury’s subsequent verdict acquitting the defendant.  For in 
determining whether the prosecution’s case is sufficient to convict, the trial judge must “view[] the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could [find] the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (first emphasis 
added); see also 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 99, § 24.6(c), and, in addition, she normally makes her decision before 
the defendant presents his case.  The jury, on the other hand, must consider not only the prosecution’s evidence, but 
also the defense case; it also must judge the credibility of the witnesses, both those called by the prosecution and 
those called by the defendant.  See Jackson, supra, at 320 (stating it is “the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to 
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to 
ultimate facts”); Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) (“Our legal system . . . is built on the premise that 
it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses . . . .”).  Thus, the jury might not 
believe some testimony that, if believed, would have proven the prosecution’s case; or, despite the sufficiency of the 
prosecution’s evidence, the jury might nevertheless find the defendant not guilty after hearing his evidence, 
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including perhaps his own testimony.  Laypersons, however, may not make these distinctions.  Rather, they may 
well reason that because the jury acquitted the defendant, which is what the trial judge initially did by deciding to 




It is true, of course, that in those cases in which the appellate court reverses the trial 
judge’s decision to direct a verdict of not guilty and the jury ultimately convicts the accused, 
members of the community might conclude that the existence of the right to appeal prevented a 
miscarriage of justice that would have resulted in the acquittal of a factually guilty individual, 
and may thereby gain confidence in the legal system.  Indeed, absent a right of appeal on the 
part of the prosecution, acquittals in cases involving serious offenses can give rise to anger and 
frustration in the community at large,380 and can cause the public, or a large segment of it, to lose 
                                                 
380  The New South Wales Law Reform Commission recognized this fact when it stated in its report on 
directed verdicts of acquittal that “understandable community outrage . . . would result in the event of a worst case 
occurring, the acquittal by manifest error of an accused charged with an extremely serious offence, without an 
opportunity for the jury to deliberate properly upon the evidence or for the Crown to appeal the acquittal.”  N.S.W. 
LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 3.5.  However, for the reason stated in the text, see infra 
text accompanying note 382, the Commission concluded that “[s]uch a scenario . . . is very unlikely.”  N.S.W. LAW 
REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 3.5 (also noting that a senior public defender stated that “in his 
experience it is very rare for a judge to direct a verdict in a murder case”). 
The acquittal by a jury of an individual whom the public perceives to be guilty often gives rise to public 
outrage and, at least in the short-term, a loss of public confidence in the legal system.  The case involving former 
American football player O.J. Simpson in his 1995 trial for the murders of his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and 
her friend Ronald Goldman, see “Not Guilty,” Simpson Free After Acquittal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 1995, at 1, 
available at 1995 WLNR 2139224, illustrates this point.  The jury’s acquittal of Simpson led to severe criticism and 
gave rise to a lack of faith in the criminal justice system among large segments of the American public.  See Charles 
J. Ogletree, Jr., Civil Rights Left Imprint on 1995, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 31, 1995, Sunday Reader at 1J 
(stating “White Americans, shocked at the verdict, viewed [the acquittal of O.J. Simpson] as a compelling example 
of power and money influencing justice and black jurors’ sympathy for a black defendant”), available at 1995 
WLNR 5257522.  See also Stan Grossfeld, Locked in on the Hoop, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2008, Sports at 1 
(stating the not guilty verdict in Simpson’s murder trial “polarized America along racial lines”), available at 2008 
WLNR 23663142; Ashley Powers & Harriet Ryan, Simpson Saga Takes New Turn with Robbery Sentencing, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, Business, page unavailable (stating Simpson’s acquittal of murder “polarized Americans”), 
available at 2008 WLNR 23432481.  Other jury acquittals have led to similar outrage amongst the public.  See, 
e.g., Angry Callers Flood Times Switchboard, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at 23, available at 1992 WLNR 3978211 
(reporting that shortly after the announcement of the verdict acquitting four white Los Angeles police officers on 
charges brought in connection with the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an African-American motorist, “callers 
from across the country flooded the Los Angeles Times switchboard–most with angry comments on the outcome”); 
Richard A. Serrano, Violence Follows Acquittals, Jury Decision in L.A. Beating Case Spurs Outrage, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Apr. 30, 1992, at 1A, available at 1992 WLNR 1590071 (reporting on riots that followed the acquittals 
of four white police officers on charges brought in connection with the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an 




faith in the criminal justice system.381   But such cases are likely to be rare.  For it is a 
“reasonable assumption . . . that the more serious the charge, the less likely the [trial] judge 
would be to intervene and direct a verdict where there is credible evidence to be put to the 
jury.”382  Perhaps more importantly, though, “[a]n obvious result of the rule against double 
jeopardy is that occasionally guilty persons will escape punishment,”383 and members of the 
community might well recognize this fact and accept it as an “inevitable [part of the] system of 
justice.”384  On balance, then, it seems the negative effect on the community’s respect for, and 
confidence in, the legal system of allowing the prosecution a right to appeal a trial judge’s 
decision to enter a required finding of not guilty outweighs any positive effect it may have, and 
therefore will, to some extent, frustrate this purpose of the rule against double jeopardy. 
 
8.  Encouraging Efficient Investigation and Prosecution 
                                                 
381  ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 7.56.  See also N.S.W. LAW REFORM 
COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 2.15 (“[T]he public may regard [a directed verdict based upon a judicial 
error] as a miscarriage of justice for failing to impose a sanction for wrongdoing, or to safeguard the public in cases 
where the danger posed by a guilty party would have rendered a custodial sentence appropriate.  Members of the 
public may be left with the impression that a guilty person has escaped justice because of a legal technicality, a 
perception which can lead to a weakening of public confidence in the judicial system.”). 
382  N.S.W. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 259, para. 3.5. 
383  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4. 
384  Id. 
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As a general matter, allowing the government to try a previously-acquitted individual a 
second time for the same offense could give rise to the danger that the police would not initially 
investigate the matter,385 and prosecutors would not initially prosecute the case,386 as diligently 
as they otherwise might.  For they would know that if the first prosecution failed, they would 
get a “second bite at the apple,”387 and could carry out a more thorough investigation before, and 
conduct a more vigorous prosecution at, the individual’s second trial.  The fact that the rule 
against double jeopardy generally provides the government only one opportunity to convict an 
individual of an offense “operates as a powerful incentive to efficient and exhaustive 
investigation”388 and prosecution.389 
                                                 
385  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11; AUSTRALIAN MODEL 
CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 20, at 2.  See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4 (“It is to the first 
trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the police] should be directed.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 13, para. 19 (noting that one of the arguments against creating exceptions to the 
traditional rule barring retrial following an acquittal is that “a second opportunity to prosecute would encourage the 
police to be less thorough in their initial investigation”). 
386  Dennis, supra note 104, at 941.  See also FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 4 (“It is to the first trial . . . 
that [the] efforts [of the prosecutor] should be directed.”). 
387  Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). 
388  ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11.  See also N.Z. LAW 
COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 344, para. 16 (stating that the argument that the rule against double jeopardy 
“promot[es] . . . efficient investigation preceding prosecution of the original trial” “has obvious force”).  But see 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra note 13, paras. 46-48 (reporting that 
neither the Director of Public Prosecutions nor the Chief Constable of Kent agreed that an exception to the 
traditional rule against double jeopardy allowing a second trial when new and compelling evidence of an acquitted 
defendant’s guilt is discovered would “allow the police to proceed without due diligence” in their initial 
investigation, and concluding that “[w]e do not expect that the proposed relaxation of the double jeopardy rule 
would have an adverse impact on the quality of future police investigations” (emphasis deleted)). 
389  Dennis, supra note 104, at 941. 
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Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that a statute or rule of court permitting the prosecution 
to appeal a court-ordered acquittal and to retry him, or resume his initial trial, if the appeal 
succeeds, would cause police and prosecutors to be less efficient in their initial investigation and 
prosecution of crimes.  When police are investigating a crime and when prosecutors are 
preparing for a criminal trial, they have every incentive, given the rule against double jeopardy, 
to obtain and present as much evidence as possible to establish the guilt of the individual 
suspected of, or charged with, the crime in question.  For they cannot accurately predict whether 
the trial judge will determine that some of their evidence is inadmissible at trial or, perhaps more 
importantly, whether the fact finder will reject as unreliable some of the evidence introduced by 
the prosecution at trial or refuse to draw the desired inferences from the prosecution’s evidence.  
Limiting the scope of an investigation or the amount of evidence presented at trial would 
increase the chances the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) will conclude that the evidence the 
prosecution introduced at trial fails to establish a prima facie case of guilt and therefore find the 
defendant not guilty.  Such a result of course would put an end to the case without a conviction. 
 For the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the prosecution from appealing a jury’s verdict390 (or 
in a bench trial, the trial judge’s finding391) of not guilty. 
                                                 
390  Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (implied acquittal of charged greater offense by conviction 
for lesser offense); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 797 (1969); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957) 
(implied acquittal of charged greater offense by conviction for lesser offense); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 
671 (1896). 
391  Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 133 (1904) (although the decision was based on a statute 
extending double jeopardy protection to the Philippines, not on the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Supreme Court in 
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133 n.13 (1980), stated that it “has accepted [the] decision [in Kepner] 
as having correctly stated the relevant double jeopardy principles” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  See also 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573 n.12 (1977) (dictum) (“In the situation where a 
criminal prosecution is tried to a judge alone, there is no question that the Double Jeopardy Clause accords his 
determination in favor of a defendant full constitutional effect.”). 
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Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of not 
guilty does not change the incentives.  As a result, police are not likely to wrap up their 
investigation immediately upon concluding the evidence they had so far obtained was sufficient 
to survive a motion for a court-ordered acquittal,392 or that prosecutors would seek and present 
only enough evidence to meet this standard.  For even if their assessment of the evidence is 
right and the limited amount of evidence survives a motion for a directed verdict, the particular 
jury trying the case (or the judge in a bench trial) might not make the inferences desired by the 
prosecution or might view the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses differently than the 
police and prosecutors, or the jury (or judge in a bench trial) might credit the evidence 
introduced by the accused, and acquit the accused,393 thereby ending the case once and for all.394 
 Moreover, evidence thought by the police and prosecutors to be sufficient to establish the 
defendant’s guilt might be viewed differently by the trial judge, and she might end the case 
without even permitting the jury to consider the case395 (or, in a bench trial, without requiring the 
                                                 
392  Most police officers do not have a legal education, and they almost certainly do not have experience in 
trying cases.  In addition, the police are unlikely to have knowledge of all the evidence against the suspect 
possessed by prosecutors.  Consequently, the police probably would not even know when their investigation had 
reached the point that the evidence against the suspect would suffice to establish a prima facie case of guilt, if indeed 
such point is identifiable.  Moreover, even if the police ended their investigation at the point at which the evidence 
would be just sufficient to survive a motion for a court-ordered acquittal, prosecutors, after reviewing the evidence, 
would realize the case against the suspect was marginal at best and would probably insist the police resume their 
investigation in an attempt to discover additional evidence implicating the suspect in the crime in question. 
393  In deciding a motion for a court-ordered acquittal, the trial judge must take the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution.  A jury (or a judge in a bench trial), however, must consider not only the 
prosecution’s evidence, but also the defense case, and in addition, must judge the credibility of the witnesses for 
each side.  See supra note 379. 
394  See supra text accompanying notes 71-74 & 80-86. 
395  E.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 141-42 (1962) (per curiam). 
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defense to present its case396) by allowing a defense motion for a court-ordered acquittal.  If the 
prosecution could appeal such a decision only with leave to appeal, as provided in the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003,397 and it was unable to obtain such leave,398 the trial judge’s ruling would 
stand, the defendant would be acquitted, and the prosecution would lose its case.399  Even if the 
prosecution obtained leave to appeal, it would have no guarantee the appellate court, in what 
almost by definition would be a “close case,”400 would find the trial judge erred in concluding 
the defendant was entitled to a court-ordered acquittal and would reverse that ruling and order 
either a new trial or the resumption of the initial trial.401  Accordingly, even if the prosecution 
could by statute or rule of court appeal a trial judge’s decision to allow a motion for a directed 
verdict, police and prosecutors could never be certain–or for that matter, even reasonably 
                                                 
396  E.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 141 (1986). 
397  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 57(4) (Eng.) (requiring the prosecution to obtain leave to appeal 
from either the trial judge of the Court of Appeal). 
398  In England, the Court of Appeal, and presumably the trial judge, in deciding whether to allow leave to 
appeal a ruling of no case to answer, must “look rather more widely at the interests of justice than simply . . . ask . . . 
the question whether an appeal has a realistic prospect of success, or some other test directed solely at the merits of 
the appeal.”  R v. A., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [8], [2009] 1 Crim. App. 21, at 283 (Eng.).  Under this standard, 
the Court of Appeal might deny leave to appeal even if it the trial judge erred in concluding the prosecution’s 
evidence failed to establish a prima facie case of guilt. 
399  See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)-(9)(a) (providing that the prosecution can appeal only if it 
informs the trial court it agrees the defendant should be acquitted if, inter alia, “leave to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal is not obtained”).  
400  The trial judge certainly would not have ruled in the defendant’s favor and allowed his motion for a 
court-ordered acquittal if the prosecution’s evidence clearly established a prima facie case of the defendant’s guilt.  
Moreover, if the accused could appeal only with leave, it would be unlikely the appellate court (or the trial judge) 
would have allowed such leave if the evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief clearly entitled the defendant to a 
court-ordered acquittal, that is, if the prosecution’s evidence undeniably failed to establish the defendant’s guilt.  
The fact that the appellate court (or the trial judge) allowed leave to appeal strongly indicates the question of the 
sufficiency of the evidence was a close one.  
401  Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Court of Appeal could reverse the trial judge’s ruling of no 
case to answer but still order the defendant be acquitted if it concluded the defendant could not receive a fair trial if 
his initial trial were resumed or if a fresh trial were ordered.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(c), (5). 
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sure–they would get a “second bite at the apple”402 should the trial judge rule the prosecution 
failed to introduce evidence sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  
As a result, they would have every incentive to put forth their best efforts to investigate the 





                                                 
402  Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). 
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The Criminal Justice Act 2003 changed criminal procedure in England by, inter alia, 
allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer, i.e., a directed 
verdict of not guilty, and to retry the defendant for the same offense, or resume his initial trial, if 
the Court of Appeal overturns the trial judge’s ruling.  An argument can be made that a state or 
federal statute or rule of court based upon these provisions of the Act would be consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Massachusetts403 and would pass constitutional muster 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.  However, even if one accepts the argument that the 
provisions of such a statute or rule of court would not be inconsistent with current case law, an 
analysis of the policies underlying the guarantee against double jeopardy reveals that several of 
those policies would be thwarted by such a provision. 
One of the most important purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to minimize the 
ordeal of the trial process.404  Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s court-ordered 
acquittal frustrates this purpose, because, if the prosecution’s appeal succeeds, the accused, 
through no fault of his own, will in most cases be required to undergo a second trial and will 
suffer the embarrassment, distress, and perhaps expense brought about by that second trial even 
though the trial judge already decided he should be acquitted of the offense.405 
                                                 
403  543 U.S. 462 (2005).  See supra text accompanying notes 180-215. 
404  See supra text accompanying notes 94 & 255-68. 
405  See supra text accompanying notes 269-90. 
At a minimum, the defendant would be subjected to additional proceedings going to his guilt or innocence, 
i.e., the resumption of his initial trial.  But as previously explained, the resumption of the original trial is unlikely to 
be a viable option in most cases.  See supra note 320.  Accordingly, this section of the Article will merely focus on 
the double jeopardy ramifications of a second trial for the same offense. 
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Perhaps more importantly, permitting a second trial for the same offense following a 
successful appeal by the prosecution would increase the risk of erroneously convicting an 
innocent person, primarily because the prosecution almost certainly will attempt to strengthen its 
case at the second trial.406  This would undermine a major purpose407 of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  Moreover, convicting an innocent person is of particular concern in the United States, 
for it is a “‘fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an 
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.’”408 
In addition, permitting the prosecution to retry an individual for the same offense after it 
successfully appeals a court-ordered acquittal would undermine two other purposes of the rule 
against double jeopardy.  First, it would frustrate the rule’s policy409 of conserving scarce 
prosecutorial and judicial resources.410  And second, it also might, at least to some extent, cause 
the public to lose respect for, and confidence in, the criminal justice system.411 
                                                 
406  See supra text accompanying notes 310-31. 
407  See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. 
As stated earlier, see supra note 292, Professor Friedland asserts that the increased chances of convicting an 
innocent person at a second trial for the same offense “is at the core of the problem.”  FRIEDLAND, supra note 11, at 
4. 
408  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)).  See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“We believe 
that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned.” (quoting 
William O. Douglas. Foreword to JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY, at 11-12 (1957))); 2 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *358 (“[T]he law hold that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one 
innocent suffer.” (quoted in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1995))). 
Justice Harlan put it another way when he stated: “In a criminal case . . . [society] do[es] not view the social 
disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”  
Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
409  See supra text accompanying notes 101 & 362-63. 
410  See supra text accompanying notes 364-71. 
411  See supra text accompanying notes 372-84. 
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In light of the purposes of the rule against double jeopardy, it is highly probable that a 
retrial for the same offense following a prosecution appeal of a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal 
ruling would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy.  Accordingly, any appeal by the 
prosecution authorized by statute or rule of court would not serve a “proper purpose”412 and 
therefore would be impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.413 
                                                 
412  Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986). 
413  Id.  (“When a successful postacquittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, the appeal has no proper purpose.  Allowing such an appeal would frustrate the 
interest of the accused in having an end to the proceedings against him.”). 
